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In educational circles examination is seen as the exemplary case of an abstract oppressor.  This allows a 
conception of ‘good education’ to be contrasted with ‘bad influences’ that are said to pollute the educational 
project with their noxious effects.  This is misleading.  Examination does not oppress education simply because 
at their formation modern educational institutions, such as schools, adopted its principles and procedures and 
have depended upon them ever since.  Examinations have come to form modern subjectivities and, hence, their 
negative attributes cannot be simply removed from education and from the citizens they create.  A radical 
critique of examinations must begin elsewhere, by objecting to what we became under their influence. 
 
!
!
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On Progress 
 
I work in a building once occupied by architects.  I am told they designed radio 
telescopes for receiving messages from outer space.  It goes without saying 
that today our concerns are more immediate.   
* 
At its inception more than a century ago, the Department of Education that 
now employs me could boast the following equipment:   
 
The Department is equipped with the apparatus of a small pedagogical research 
laboratory, including a Hipp Chronoscope, Macdougall’s Attention Machine, 
Rauschberg’s Association and Memory Apparatus, Netschajef’s Reaction Time 
Apparatus, Ebbinghaus Memory Apparatus, Jacquet’s Sphymograph, Romer’s 
Voice Key, Minnemann’s Card Changing Apparatus, Wundt’s Tachistoscope, 
Wundt’s Control Hammer, Kymograph, &c., &c.1 
 
In a school on the outskirts of the city similar devices reappear.  A small girl 
stands about to be photographed, positioned on a weighing machine for the 
shot.2  She peers at the camera whilst her teacher attends to the balances.  Her 
head cocked to one side, and her face entirely blank, this photographic record 
tells us little of what was going on inside.   
* 
Measuring the child in 1911 was a physical activity by which features such as 
weight and height were collected and noted down.  Examination of the mind 
in abstraction from the body was rare.  As a technique, the mental test was still 
in its infancy and generally depended upon physical tricks, such as tests of 
reaction time, that were later found to correlate poorly with subjective 
impressions of intelligence.  This would soon change.  Within a mere decade 
another type of test became common, one that would not depend on this 
circus of tricks.  It became known as the intelligence or IQ test.  A hundred 
years on this form of mental assessment is now so old that its use has become 
unremarkable.  Today all young minds are routinely extracted, quantified and 
subjected to the language of statistical estimation.  This form of extraction, a 
process by which the child is dissected and then reconstructed, has become 
entirely banal.   
* 
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Children are today surrounded by the chatter of statistical work, a language 
informed by practices of assessment that are laced throughout schooling and 
its surrounding activities.  Convention dictates that such extractions are part of 
a neutral process or, at least, that they should aspire to technical neutrality.  
This is the first denial of power. 
Accordingly, knowledge of the child must be separated from the effects of 
bias; it must be objective, correct and reliable.  If an assessment bias of some 
sort is discovered, it must be removed.  This scientific procedure is governed 
by an explicit set of principles that have been rationally agreed.  It is the 
product of a vast industry of professionals and their expert pronouncements.  
Examination must have an even and regular appearance; it should be without 
blemish.  There is a sense of fairness and decency that comes with carefully 
designed, carefully administered assessment, or so we are encouraged to feel.  
This resides in its scientific, non-arbitrary, incorruptible technique. 
Those critics who rightly claim that bias remains, who doggedly persist in 
searching it out, do not escape from the conceptual frame they appear to 
challenge.  However shrill they become in their objections and denunciations, 
their objections still issue from within the terms of this debate: they speak in 
the language of bias and fairness.  The framework of examination thereby 
remains intact, and is perhaps also a little reinforced. 
* 
Some educators seek to reject scientific measurement in its entirety.  They 
hope to escape its assumptions concerning the nature of the learner or the 
nature and purpose of education more generally.  As if their will to escape were 
enough!   
Others try, more humbly, to diminish its effects.  They promote our 
recognition of the whole child, of a human presence that must be respected, 
that must remain uncut, un-extracted.  The individual learner ought to be 
accommodated in terms of his or her own unique completeness.  We do 
violence to the child, they say, if we pare things down to the narrow language 
of a statistical judiciary.  Believing that more humane forms of assessment are 
possible, that they are already on the horizon if only we were prepared to 
travel, those of this persuasion have developed other, rival techniques for 
appreciating the child.  These practical innovations are, though, issued from a 
position of rivalry that is more apparent than real.   
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* 
For those who reject the dominion of scientific measurement, grades and 
ranks are diligently avoided in favour of individual recommendations and 
constructive advice.  The child is encouraged to avoid comparison with others 
and to focus on the process of learning.  The key, it seems, is to avoid looking 
elsewhere for guidance or for reason to blame.  One must focus on the self in 
order to celebrate the self and the unique developmental stage this self has 
reached.  There are no generalisations, no universals against which the learner 
can be compared, and then ranked and judged.  Each moment is its own.  As 
such the ownership of each moment cannot be disputed, it is the learner’s to 
possess.  The learner must learn to take responsibility for that temporal slice, 
to diagnose it, and to deliver him or herself from it towards the next 
incomparable step of learning.  This leads to a perverse situation where ‘there 
is no longer anything the self can hold on to, other than itself’.3  Despite the 
surrounding warmth of feeling, the child is rendered alone. Examination 
becomes a process of extreme personalisation that functions almost ‘like an 
amputation’.4   
* 
Extreme personalisation does not create selves that are perfectly atomised.  
These selves are not entirely cut off from one another.  It remains true that ‘no 
self is an island; each exists in a fabric of relations’.5  What has changed, 
however, is that the self in question increasingly sits within a fabric of relations 
designed to fold back on the self, to refer back to each self in carefully 
individuated terms.  This disguises the operations of a malevolent power, 
obscuring a set of relations that forms the wider structure of feeling.   
* 
The framework within which the individual is constructed remains hidden 
from view.  In this way, social amputation operates as an insidious divider.  
From the perspective of its supporters this tradition of humanised assessment 
looks very different, of course.  It has all but divorced itself from the 
deleterious effects of power, they feel.  Their methods have been designed, 
quite deliberately to operate without bias and certainly without violence.  Their 
pedagogy is presented as self-evident and neutral (‘it is just the way we all 
learn’).  And the experience of assessment and learning that it promotes is 
certainly intended to feel nothing like amputation!  The child must be kept 
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whole, that is their basic tenet; the whole child is their aim and object.  After 
all, these educators hold to higher principles; their activities are geared towards 
the flourishing of all.  As with their rival (the statistical tradition) there is 
repeated here an insistence on neutrality, on the absence of power.  This is the 
second denial. 
* 
There is a third denial of power that is associated with the examination of 
human worth.  One stumbles across it frequently.  I encountered it when 
overhearing an educator in conversation with a cynic.  Actually I was part of 
the discussion, though I was experiencing one of those ‘little touches of 
solitude’ to which I am susceptible.6   
The teacher was describing a scheme he had in mind to improve the 
prospects of state school pupils.   The situation the teacher wished to confront 
is a familiar one: children of those parents who are able and willing to afford 
them a private education have a greater chance of making it to the country’s 
elite universities.  In these high-blown institutions, state school pupils are still, 
as a group, under-represented.  The scheme he described was based on a 
simple hypothesis: children of the state are disadvantaged, he said, because 
they perform less well at interview.  The proposed intervention follows 
naturally enough: to offer state school pupils mock interviews as a form of 
preparation.   
The cynic poured scorn on the entire plan as you might expect: the system 
is already rigged, he said.  It is hopeless to believe that a little interview 
technique could overturn an entire social edifice that is marred by injustices 
and systemic biases.  If you are born poor you die poor; if you are born rich 
you die rich: the elites have ways and means of maintaining their advantage.  
The teacher agreed wholeheartedly but then disavowed what he had just 
admitted.  ‘You are right,’ he said, ‘but I just can’t allow it’.  That, for me, was the 
crux of the matter: in all practical concerns the teacher was compelled to hold 
on to the illusion of duly awarded merit, otherwise where would that leave his 
scheme, and indeed his profession?   
The details of the plan were also significant in their own way.  The idea was 
to invite carefully selected ‘strangers’ to the school.  This was based on the 
assumption that the true interview (the interview without bias) is an encounter 
with strangers.  Leaving aside the elementary point that some strangers are 
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stranger than others (the private school pupil may find the strangers on the 
interview panel more familiar than the state school pupil), there was something 
deeply ironic about this situation.  Schools commence by telling their pupils: 
‘Never speak to strangers!’ and finish with the concern that their pupils have 
lost the ability to do so.   
* 
Though there is plenty of cause for cynicism (it’s all rigged and so on), we do 
nevertheless reassure ourselves that privilege is no longer publicly supportable.  
In the liberal West, to bring attention to someone’s privilege is to offer that 
person an insult.  The implication, clearly enough, is that the person in 
question would have been unable to succeed on merit alone and does not 
deserve our recognition.  Noble birth may continue to bring its hidden 
advantages, but these conveyances are said to be on the wane.  Nepotism – the 
practice whereby those with power or influence favour relatives and friends – 
is no longer publicly defensible.  It follows the fate of its precursor, the 
arrangement of judicious marriages, which has long been a topic of ridicule.7  
Though we admit that covert systems, systems that convey undue advantage, 
are still very much in existence – where the middle-classes are perhaps now the 
most adept game players in town – most people gaming the system today 
would be embarrassed to admit foul play.  The cynicism that afflicts us is not 
quite that well set.8  If we cynically ‘buy’ our way to a qualification or position, 
we still feel compelled to conceal what we have done.  The felt need for 
concealment here can be taken as a mark of progress, progressives believe.  
This sense of shame rather proves the point from the perspective of the social 
optimist: meritocracy has become an unquestionable good. 
* 
It is commonly believed that we live in a meritocracy.  The advocates of this 
faith remind themselves that power was once a brazen, openly patriarchal, and 
unashamedly naked force.  They flatter themselves with the idea that the 
blatant interventions of patronage have been largely replaced by scientific 
measurement and democratic correction, by tools providing better estimates of 
capability than birth, blood or noble origin ever could.  Though some critics 
still complain of a continued class, gender or race bias in assessment, I would 
argue that their complaints are in a sense superficial.  Their criticisms issue 
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from, circulate through, and are deposited back within the same system of 
meritocratic assumptions.   
More baldly put, one might say that this entire debate finds itself located 
within a narrative of Western advance.  According to this narrative, progress in 
the production of knowledge – including knowledge gained from examination 
– translates more or less directly into advances of justice, fairness and liberty.  
From this perspective, examination and the knowledge it produces, needs only 
further refinement and better implementation as we work towards greater 
equality of opportunity through more perfected meritocratic techniques.  
Education systems are viewed as having become more transparent and more 
accountable through the production of knowledge about and within them.  
This transparency will, it is believed, overthrow those systems of power that 
are said to multiply when knowledge is thin and human existence undisclosing.  
In such an educational context, with the effects of power largely ‘removed’, 
ability has for the first time in history a genuine chance to triumph over 
background and hence over power.  Ability takes precedence over the 
influence of one’s connections, of strings pulled in the shadows.  Those who 
accept this progressive narrative flatter themselves that even though 
imperfections remain; the aspiration to achieve perfected meritocratic order is 
firmly embedded.   
* 
As a regulating idea, meritocracy serves to structure and condition perception.  
In providing the framework upon which judgements are made, it functions as 
if it were timeless.  Meritocracy is one of those moral touchstones many 
believe can be invoked without reasonable objection to judge social existence.  
The meritocratic ideal fulfils an essential role in those societies that have 
endured the combined onslaught of modernity and secularism, those societies 
that are marked by the defeat of religious authority, and as a result, no longer 
order their perception according to the metaphysical logic of a divine order.  
More earthly principles are now depended upon to regulate lived experience.  
It is here that the principle of meritocracy – a delicate but enduring concoction 
– has become the primary operator for a secular order.   
* 
In his commentary on Nietzsche,9  Henry Staten contrasts the Christian order 
of discourse – which attempts ‘to recuperate the suffering of history by 
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projecting a divine plan that assigns it a reason now and a recompense later’ – 
to the secularised narrative of a latter-day liberal humanism.  Unable to cope 
with the possibility that there is no single explanation for the accumulated 
disorder of history – only the brute fact of that ‘overwhelming spectacle of 
cruelty, stupidity and suffering’ – Left liberals and humanists find a secular 
replacement for the Christian precursor. 10   According to their revised 
understanding, ‘all those lives ground up in the machine of history are assigned 
an intelligible role as victims of oppression and injustice’.  This is the ‘implicit 
teleology’ of modern self-understanding which ‘gives form and meaning to the 
rest of history’.  From their elevated perspective extends an ‘invisible line of 
rectitude’ used to judge human existence, a line of rectitude that would 
presumably continue to traverse history ‘even though [its originating] 
community of belief my cease to exist’.11  It is a position of self-professed pre-
eminence that allows those who identify with it to stand outside history and act 
as supreme arbitrators, like gods, judging all societies alike according to their 
universal criteria.  These defenders of our common humanity ‘cannot accept,’ 
as John Gray argues, ‘that a world in which their liberal ideals are constantly 
mocked does not secretly revere them’.12  Like me, they sleep a little higher, 
and yet they refuse to wake up.  Perhaps they should be permitted this 
temporal respite, as a prisoner might be allowed to rest on the way to the 
gallows.  Eventually, though, liberals and humanists alike must leave this dream 
state and learn to admit the fragile foundations of their self-professed 
superiority. 
The principle of meritocracy can be found within the ailing foundations of 
their humanistic tradition.  It is remarkable, in fact, that such a fragile idea has 
been and still is used in this way, functioning as a key line of rectitude or ‘sliver 
of light’,13 which somehow entitles those who possess it to illuminate and 
appraise the past, present, and future alike.  According to this singular line, a 
just society will be, amongst other things, a meritocratic one, where 
meritocracy provides the scale against which social progress is judged.  More 
advanced societies are deemed to be those that are more meritocratic.  They 
make fewer decisions based on prejudice and extend opportunity further.  
Meritocracy is also used as a measure of corruption, where corrupt societies or 
corrupt institutions are thought to be those that violate the formula: merit = 
ability + effort.  Meritocratic societies are open and fair, non-meritocratic ones 
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are obscure and underhand.  The conclusion is familiar; meritocracies are 
places where power is in retreat.   
* 
As a myth, meritocracy acts to support and legitimate unequal societies.14  
Whilst meritocracy is a comparatively recent social invention with no claim to 
universality, it performs an important and seemingly indestructible ideological 
function.  It absorbs displeasure – a bitterness that is the product of inequality 
– by diffusing it and individuating it within a system that sanctions differential 
rewards, a system that assigns individuals to unequal economic positions 
according to their own ‘effort’ and ‘merit’.  It sets to work any remaining 
vexations issuing from those who retain a social conscience by diverting these 
desires for a different, more equal social order into the pursuit of system 
neutrality.  This sublimation of desire is expressed through the fight against 
patronage or unfair influence, and through the development and distribution 
of accounting techniques and traditions of ‘unbiased’ measurement.  It should 
be noted that, in the context of these earnest campaigns for more justly 
distributed inequalities, cases of residual nepotism are not as disruptive to the 
meritocratic ideal as they may at first appear.  When individuals or groups are 
singled out for their unfair privilege, they serve an important function, 
reinforcing the principle of meritocracy amongst those who depend upon it to 
animate their contempt.    
* 
The ubiquity of meritocracy in liberal societies seems unassailable.  If 
circumstances were different, perhaps we could let this spectre alone and allow 
it to continue as a ponderous, but harmless preoccupation.  But this continued 
faith in the eternal form of the meritocratic ideal has become embroiled in a 
scandal of perception, and this scandal has had its victims.  Even though as a 
collective ideal meritocracy clearly still exists, as a practical administrative project it 
has long since been dismissed from the scene of government.  It no longer 
persists in that corporeal form.  We nevertheless remain psychologically attached to 
the idea of meritocracy, so much so that we are unable to fully perceive its 
departure, nor take the measure of the system that replaced it.  We cannot 
recognise our period as one in which disorder and the impossibility of fairness are 
principles that have been elevated above their opposites and incorporated 
within governmental technique.  The period within which we live is one that 
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exists after fairness and beyond justice, following a transition that took place largely 
unremarked.  This transition occurred as the children of the late twentieth 
century learned how to live a life without fairness, as they were prepared for an 
existence where hope is more instrumental to their lives than the guarantee of 
justice, as they were schooled in a range of personal strategies and dispositions 
necessary for a docile and productive existence within a deliberately 
unsystematic social order.   
Meritocracy, today, bears little resemblance to its former self, even though 
many resolutely hold on to its earlier definition; it has been transformed in 
spite of the fact that many are still preoccupied with its accompanying mission 
to eradicate power by removing the effects of unfair influence.  A fissure has 
opened up between an abstract principle of justice and a social project within 
which reason has been suspended.  This void now engulfs all well-meaning 
efforts oriented towards inclusion, fair opportunity and just desert.  Within this 
space that remains hidden from view (as does a quarry beyond the crest of a 
hill) machinations of government have been able to extend and multiply, 
adjusting and furthering their capacity to quell dissent. 
* 
False assumptions concerning the absence of power in scientific assessment, 
the benign intent of its rival anti-numerical approach and the universalism of 
the meritocratic ideal, were culpable in a wider transformation through which 
we entered this life beyond fairness.  We cannot even complain that fairness is 
absent for this complaint has been emptied of meaning.  A belief in progress 
and an abstract faith in the institutions of liberalism and democracy also served 
to obscure the many ‘dark sides’ of power.  Profoundly misguided in our 
commitments and in our estimates of the chief concerns of the day, many of 
us arrived at our current predicament staring intently in the wrong direction.   
* 
For those who maintain that it is time to inaugurate a resistance, perhaps even 
a collective refusal, the first step is to insist that power is never in retreat.   
Violence continues without interruption.   
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Modern Examination 
 
To speak of the history of examination makes little sense.  As a concept, 
examination is neither bland nor universal enough for such a history to be 
written.  It cannot stretch across time gathering together all related events as 
their collecting term.  Like the history it confronts this is an unstable concept.  
It is, moreover, insufficiently distinct from close associates such as 
‘assessment’.   
At times the words assessment and examination can be used almost 
synonymously.  At others they drift apart.  Whilst examination is often used to 
refer to the formal process by which candidates are judged for a particular 
qualification or post, assessment has a more general meaning and can refer to 
informal as well as formal activities.   
There are other differences:  In medieval alchemy, examination refers to 
the attempt to test or assay a precious metal in order to determine its purity.  It 
is also associated with close scrutiny or investigation by inspection in order to 
establish the truth or qualities of an object, statement or calculation.  Finally, 
examination refers to the interrogation of a person in order to determine his or 
her state of mind, knowledge or capacity.  Assessment, by contrast has been 
associated with the determination of a fine, charge or tax.  It is also linked to 
the valuation of property.  Whilst examination in its various uses is about 
inspection and truth – assessment adds to this the idea of distribution, 
remuneration and desert.  Depending on my focus, I will switch terms.  This 
chapter refers chiefly to examination, dealing as it does with the history of a 
device used to generate truth through inspection.  Later chapters are 
concerned more directly with assessment: they investigate the valuation and 
distribution of human worth.  This switch from examination to assessment is 
not without consequence, reflecting as it does a diminishing concern for truth. 
* 
In the West, two distinct traditions of examination can be identified, these 
being, modern examination and its medieval precursor.  Both were brought 
into being as institutional devices, assisting those institutions in games of 
subjugation.   
Arriving during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Europe, medieval 
examination beat the Bubonic Plague by a century.  This is not to boast on 
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behalf of examination; it merely sets a scene.  The pandemic was certainly a 
fearsome episode in human history, and yet there was a far more dangerous 
sickness already endemic in 1348 that is to be feared precisely because we do 
not experience it as such. 
The plague arrived, so they say, on merchant ships upon which Oriental 
rats and their fleas hitched a ride.  Examination has similar intercontinental 
connections, but we will remain in the West along with the fleas.  Here we 
commonly perceive those who existed before medieval examination and 
certainly those who existed before modern examination, as comparatively 
healthy.  The ancients were particularly so; at least, this is how the story goes 
where the hardy ancestor par excellence would be Socrates.   
The medievalist Charles Haskins once quipped; a ‘great teacher like 
Socrates gave no diplomas; if a modern student sat at his feet for three 
months, he would demand a certificate, something tangible and external to 
show for it’.1  Unlike Socrates’ companions who were the victims of Socratic 
dialogue, modern students are the victims of institutional life, having been so 
formed that they cannot but share the expectations of organised education.  
‘Only in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries’, Haskins continues, ‘do there 
emerge in the world those features of organised education with which we are 
most familiar, all that machinery of instruction represented by faculties and 
colleges and courses of study, examinations and commencements and 
academic degrees’.2   
* 
Almost 900 years ago, the first medieval universities were established, their 
early development being closely associated with a certain pre-modern ritual of 
examination.  Formal medieval education was a minority privilege.  The 
favoured few entered a system that we may struggle to understand in 
retrospect because it failed to employ many of those features that we associate 
with formal education today.  There were few graduated steps in the subjects 
taught. These subjects were not broken down into discrete units and then 
ordered into a hierarchy of difficulty from the most elementary components to 
the most difficult concepts.  Also absent was the significance we now ascribe 
to age.  A variety of ages were taught together.3  So, whilst the life of a 
medieval student can be divided into three main phases, these divisions did not 
contain a graded hierarchy of steps and they are not best represented by age.   
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Roughly then, the elite students of the first phase were called scholars.  Four 
or more years were spent listening to lectures.  These were delivered from a list 
of prescribed texts, with each text having defined for it the number of times it 
should be heard:  ‘Hard, close drill on a few well-thumbed books was the 
rule’.4  But the required books were rare and so the education was largely an 
oral one, divided between ordinary lectures that were delivered by masters, and 
cursory lectures that were given by bachelors.  The former expounded the text, 
whilst the latter offered little more than a running commentary on it.  Lectures 
were augmented by disputations, in which the master would resolve any 
difficulties raised with respect to an authoritative text.  A scholar would attend 
the disputations of his master for two years or so, during which period he 
would respond to questions posed by the master and receive training in textual 
reconciliation.   
The second phase in the student’s career was that of bachelor, a status that 
had been borrowed from the terminology of the Guilds, i.e. a candidate for 
Mastership.  The transition from scholar to bachelor was known as the 
determination, and eligibility for this step was ascertained through a series of 
preliminary examinations, called ‘responsions’.  The candidate and his master 
were then asked to swear an oath that the former had fulfilled the 
requirements, including attendance at the prescribed lectures.  Determination 
itself involved the candidate holding a series of public disputations during 
Lent.  Having successfully determined, the bachelor resumed attendance at his 
master’s lectures.  He was required to take part in further disputations over the 
next year and take on some teaching responsibilities by delivering a course of 
cursory lectures.   
The next objective was to become a master.  After several more years of 
study and teaching the bachelor of promise reached the process of inception, 
through which admission could be gained to the master’s guild.  The candidate 
would hold an inaugural lecture together with a disputation, following which 
there was a banquet held at the inceptor’s expense.   
* 
All these examinations, commencements and academic degrees may sound 
rather tedious.5  On those occasions when I find myself subjected to some 
ceremony or other, either participating in the ritual or standing by, I like to 
think that we would all rather be elsewhere.  Those who find themselves fired 
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up by such events exhibit, for me, the surface traits of a more troubling 
inclination.  
It is with little pleasure that I spend effort recounting long dead rituals, 
such as those detailed above.  It would be far more entertaining, perhaps, to 
explore what medieval students got up to in their spare time.  But the 
ceremonial particulars are important, and we should not allow our gaze to 
follow that of the wayward student.  These events served a wider, moral 
purpose.  At the very least candidates could be rejected for inappropriate 
behaviour.  Gambling or taking part in a knife-fight with local tailors, were 
both recorded as reasons for rejection.  Paying undue attention to the 
solemnity of the event itself was another reason for dismissal.  In fifteenth 
century Vienna one candidate made the unforgivable mistake of nipping out to 
see an execution during the examination – an irresistible spectacle, one 
assumes. 6   The threat of rejection for inappropriate behaviour was, 
nevertheless, only a blunt device for the regulation of personal conduct.  The 
ceremonies themselves, these sites of medieval examination, were far more 
intricate in their effects as moral devices.  To understand how they worked we 
must appreciate the regime of truth within which the medieval scholar was 
confined.   
* 
The medieval theologian and his student follower faced a basic difficulty: the 
various church canons contradicted one another.  In this period a great deal of 
scholarly effort was expended to resolve these conflicts.  Often since dismissed 
as ‘mere scholasticism’, this form of scriptural debate is so alien to our notions 
of rational discourse that we may indeed struggle to judge the scholastic 
agenda on its own merits.  With an agenda that sets him at odds with our 
present, Alasdair MacIntyre provides a more sympathetic account.  The key 
figure for MacIntyre was the influential theologian Thomas Aquinas (born 
1225; levitated 1273; deceased 1274).  Aquinas practiced a mode of 
scholasticism that coupled deep respect for authority with an effort to resolve 
contradiction and thereby reaffirm the pre-eminence of the church fathers.  
This was also the object of university disputations at which scriptural 
difficulties could be tidied up through dialectical argument.  These carefully 
orchestrated disputes did provide a certain degree of creative space to develop 
counterarguments (for the sake of argument) before the final resolutions were 
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applied in summing up.  This opportunity was, nevertheless, short-lived being 
cut short by the concluding remarks.   
The medieval examination was an opportunity to demonstrate in discursive 
form the closeness and subtlety of one’s understanding of and adherence to 
received tradition.  ‘Research’ in the modern sense did not yet exist, with the 
‘research university’ a thing of the distant future.7  Knowledge of the truth did 
not emerge from an accumulation of facts; it was revealed following the 
correct reading of texts by someone who had developed those understandings 
that were valued by existing tradition.  This is an affront to many ears today 
due to the enduring Enlightenment belief that rational thought must 
emancipate itself from the ‘tutelage of authority’.8  It is still often presumed 
that to be rational one must think for oneself.  By contrast, scholastic 
rationalism was built on understandings that were largely tacit. These were 
absorbed gradually through, for example, attendance at and participation in the 
disputations that followed lectures.  The bachelor would slowly learn through 
experience how to apply the acknowledged standards of his craft, and identify 
mistakes.  The apprentice for mastership would also gradually learn to locate 
his efforts within the wider orbit of the scholastic universe, distinguishing 
between the ‘kind of excellence which both others and he [for it would be a 
male] can expect of himself here and now, and that ultimate excellence which 
furnishes both apprentices and master-craftsmen with their telos’, where the 
telos is their highest object or aim.9   
Intellectual and moral virtues were deemed inseparable, where the effects 
of personal desires and inclinations were of particular concern when it came to 
textual interpretation.  These tendencies were to be governed through an 
education in personal conduct.  The apprentice would learn to self-regulate in 
working towards an ideal that was, in part, exemplified by the work of the 
craft-masters in whom the apprentice placed trust.  Personal ‘defects and 
limitations in habits of judgement and habits of evaluation’ that were ‘rooted in 
corruptions and inadequacies of desire, taste, habit and judgement’ would 
become evident through training.  Though the individual concerned would 
develop a thorough appreciation of those personal attributes that were to be 
managed, the process was not individualising, and it would be a mistake to 
read it as such.  Increased self-knowledge did not separate the individual from 
his or her environment as an increasingly distinct self-referential unit.  The 
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scholar was to become enmeshed, adopting the particular rationality or 
Weltanschauung of the craft.  The apprentice would learn what it is about 
himself ‘that has to be transformed, that is, what vices need to be eradicated, 
what intellectual and moral virtues need to be cultivated’ if he was to become a 
master practitioner and so reside among like-minded peers.10  The effects of 
medieval examination were deeply formative in this sense.  This medieval 
ceremony was the culmination of a whole series of everyday personal 
reflections, inspections and petty ordeals.  It was the medieval concentrate of a 
moral device that operated throughout the student experience.   
* 
The constraints of scholastic debate were not static; there was room for 
gradual transformation.  Traditions adjusted over time, where the triumph of 
each successive stage came about under certain conditions.  The superiority of 
a new interpretation was demonstrated if a later stage was ‘able to transcend 
the limitations and failures of an earlier stage’, according to ‘the standards of 
rationality of that earlier stage itself’.11  An earlier tradition could only be 
overthrown according to arguments that made sense to it, according to attacks 
that were advanced in its terms and according to its rituals of judgement.  
What this meant was that scholarship seeking the transformation of tradition 
demanded supreme efforts of self-cultivation in order to negotiate these 
complex transitions within a tradition.  It would appear, then, that medieval 
change demanded an even deeper understanding of tradition than that was 
required when merely submitting to its existing mores.  The rebel scholar 
would need to be the most ardent and skilful practitioner of his tradition.  The 
rebel was marked by his alignment and acculturation, rather than his 
disaffiliation and militant disregard.  Only the vanity of Enlightenment thinkers 
allowed them to believe that radical thought must be ‘entirely deracinated’ from 
formative authority in order to deserve that epithet.12  
* 
Histories are rhetorical deployments.  For my purposes, medieval examination 
serves as a backcloth against which I hold its successor.  This history is not a 
progressive one.  Indeed, my juxtapositions are designed to create a 
disturbance in the present.13 
* 
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As MacIntyre would have it, the scholastic order of discourse was largely 
replaced by a post-Cartesian, encyclopaedic worldview.14  Having awoken from 
our ‘medieval slumber’, we moderns no longer appeal to external authorities.  
Guided by reason we are said to have developed independence from the 
tutelage of tradition.   
* 
That great mental sclerosis known as ‘tradition’ has been debunked, we say.  A 
new freedom allows us to question without restraint and then verify our 
answers without prejudice.  We love these answers dearly.  We set them in 
typescript and file them away. 
* 
The cold and objective tools of modern examination would seem to epitomise 
the modern perspective.  Examination, we believe, is no longer a device for 
cultivating a virtuous elite.  It has become an impersonal, calculative tool.  
Examination today, has little to do with the embodiment of moral virtues, in 
the medieval sense.  It would seem as though modern examination has 
displaced its pre-modern variant so completely that we could identify a total 
rupture in its history. 
* 
The logic of modern examination can be observed in a machine design once 
penned by the great utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham (who was born in 1748 and 
dissected at his behest for the purposes of science in 1832).  As with the 
disputation, Bentham’s modern examination was to be an oral and public 
ordeal.  In all other respects however, it was entirely at odds with its medieval 
precursor.  Bentham’s examination was not designed to secure entry to an 
order of masters; rather, as part of a constitutional code intended ‘for the use 
of all nations and all governments professing liberal opinions’, it would 
regulate admission to government posts.  Here is an extract from his 
Constitutional Code: 
 
SECTION 16: LOCABLE WHO, Enactive, ART.1. This section has for its object 
the providing, as soon as may be, and in so far as is necessary, - but no further, at 
the public expense, in relation to the business of all the several Subdepartments 
comprised in the Administration Department, a system of arrangements, whereby 
in the several official situations, appropriate aptitude in all its branches shall be 
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maximised, and at the same time expense minimized; say, a SYSTEM OF 
OFFICIAL LOCATION, or, for shortness, THE LOCATION SYSTEM.15 
 
The abridged version is as follows:  For each branch of art and science, a book 
would be provided in which ‘the whole matter of it, or such portion as shall 
have been deemed necessary and sufficient, has been cast in the form of 
questions, with correspondent answers’.16  The most advanced examinee would have 
the entire contents ‘stowed in his memory’ (for it would again be a male) and 
might be asked to respond to any question contained therein.17  It would be 
‘impracticable’ to examine the entire contents, and so only a selection of 
questions would be asked, these being selected by lot.  This would ensure a 
‘maximization of the inducement afforded to exertion on the part of learners’,18 
and would also prevent the examiner from having any ‘power of favouring or 
disfavouring’ individuals.19  
All questions in the book would be numbered and accompanied by a 
corresponding set of square tickets.  These would be arranged in numerical 
order, in the manner of squares on a chessboard, and enclosed in a square 
frame.  This would ‘suffice to render it manifest, to the requisite number of 
eyes, at one view, that for every question there is a ticket: and that for no 
questions there are tickets more than one’.20   
The tickets would be placed in a cylindrical box and thoroughly shaken by 
a number of people in turn.  For a cover, it would have a cloth, ‘in which is a 
slit, long enough to admit a hand: - fittest hand, that of a child, not old enough 
to be exposed to the suspicion of having received instructions enabling it to act 
with discrimination’.21  This would be a job for what Bentham describes as the 
non-discerning child.  Finally, those who passed this test of aptitude would bid 
for the position advertised.  In this way the overall machinery would maximise 
human resources at the minimum expense.  He who passed, and was prepared 
to sell his services at the lowest price, would get the job.  
* 
It would appear from the overwrought novelty of these designs that the logic 
of examination they were attempting to describe was highly original.  Whilst 
medieval examination cultivated the self – involving comparisons between the 
self being worked upon and surrounding tradition as exemplified by the craft 
masters – for Bentham, comparisons would take a different form; they would 
operate between individual learners.  This would allow for the efficient 
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distribution and employment of individuals, maximising aptitude and 
minimising expense.  Whilst the medieval disputation involved a competition 
of ideas the aim of which was reconciliation and synthesis, the modern 
examination made a direct attempt to engender tensions between individuals, 
to stimulate their desires, instead of resolving tensions between their desires 
and the dictates of tradition.  Modern examination appears to adopt a highly 
reductive logic, feeding from base inclinations to beat one’s neighbour.  With 
modernity, so the story goes, a sense of virtue is lost. 
* 
A corrupted form of disputation survived well into the seventeenth century,22 
further degenerating during the eighteenth century into prepared arguments, 
memorized beforehand. 23   The graduate disputation at Cambridge finally 
disappeared in 1838, with students submitted to uniform written questions 
instead.  The decline was gradual.  But if we were after significant milestones, 
1763 would be one to pick.24  In this year the disputation became a mere 
preliminary method for matching examinees according to ability, following 
which differentiated groups of candidates would have questions dictated to 
them that they would answer together and in writing.  Group dictation was 
eventually replaced in 1827 with printed questions, and from 1792, questions 
were individually marked generating increasingly fine divisions between 
examinees.   
This has been identified as ‘a most momentous step, perhaps the major 
single step towards a mathematized model of reality.’25  Examinees were tested 
in batches, side by side with their competitors, alongside whom they would 
eventually be listed in order of attainment.  A ranking procedure of 
‘unparalleled intensity and precision’26 had been developed, and with it came 
the possibility of a new scientific reckoning that would take the individual as its 
prime target.  At this point, only an elite minority were subjected to these 
dividing practices.  It would take a century or more to extend examination to 
the general populace.   
* 
For England the 1850s are sometimes viewed as the point of inflection after 
which modern examination really took off.  In 1853, the India Act established 
a precedent.  Examination was to be used in the public service, confined at 
first to the machinery of imperial rule.  As the Whig politician Thomas 
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Macaulay argued in parliament, with ‘800 men charged with the happiness of 
120,000,000 people’ there could be no room for incapacity; the aptitude of 
every imperial employee must be assured.27  In this respect, the trialling of 
examinations mirrored other imperial experiments, where the effects of newly 
invented techniques and devices including genocidal ones, were first tested 
overseas.28  With respect to government examinations, appointment through 
patronage or personal recommendation was now illegal:  All ‘Powers, Rights or 
Privileges’ to ‘nominate persons to be admitted…shall cease’.29   
Within two years, the first examinations for posts in India were taking 
place.30  Meanwhile, William Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
future Prime Minister, commissioned an enquiry that would recommend 
examinations for the Home Civil Service.31  The prototype examinations at this 
point were of university origin.  Indeed the Indian Civil Service 
Commissioners hoped to call upon the expertise of recent ‘moderators in the 
University of Cambridge’ who knew ‘by experience how to conduct the 
examination of large numbers of persons simultaneously’.32   In the same 
decade, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge began setting entrance 
examinations, marking one of the first incursions of qualifying examination 
into schooling. 33  
The rapid spread of modern examination generated a fear amongst some 
that selection by intellectual ability could not guarantee moral virtue (where 
such virtue was, of course, of a distinct breed in the context of imperialism).  If 
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modern examinations were to be the new gatekeepers, they might allow 
intellectually proficient though morally deficient, inappropriate types into 
positions of influence.  In correspondence with her chancellor, the future 
Empress of India, Queen Victoria gave vent to her fears: 
 
The Queen, although not without considerable misgivings, sanctions the proposed 
plan, trusting that Mr Gladstone will do what he can, in the arrangements of the 
details of it, to guard against the dangers...  A check, for instance, would be 
necessary upon the admission of candidates […] securing that they should be 
otherwise eligible, besides the display of knowledge which they may exhibit under 
examination.   
Queen Victoria to Mr Gladstone: Buckingham Palace 17th February 185434 
 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and 
has the honour to acknowledge your Majesty’s gracious letter. 
He takes blame himself for having caused your Majesty trouble by omitting to 
include in his short memorandum an explanation of the phrase “qualified persons”. 
Experience at the universities and public schools of this country has shown that in a 
large majority of cases the test of open examination is also an effectual test of 
character; as, except in very remarkable cases, the previous industry and self-denial, 
which proficiency evinces, are rarely separated from the general habits of virtue. 
But he humbly assures your Majesty that the utmost pains will be taken to 
provide not only for the majority but for all cases, by the strictest enquiries of 
which the case will admit; and he has the most confident belief that the securities of 
character under the system, although they cannot be unerring, will be stronger and 
more trustworthy than any of which the present method of appointment is 
susceptible. 
Mr Gladstone to Queen Victoria: Downing Street 17th February 185435 
 
This plea for modern examination is repeated elsewhere.  Assurance is given 
that that the moral character of persons selected by examination could indeed 
be guaranteed.  Additional virtues said to be nurtured by examination include; 
‘a taste for pleasures not sensual’ and a ‘desire for honourable distinction’.36  
Testimonies confirmed that for the newly examined universities ‘in more than 
nineteen cases out of twenty, men of attainments are also men of character’.  
The perseverance and self-discipline required for success in examination were 
‘a great security that a young man has not led a dissolute life’.37  An intellectual 
test, so the argument went, was ‘the best moral test that can be devised’.38  
Admittedly, these were mere defensive retorts.  Nevertheless, they were also 
truer than their authors imagined.   
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* 
Bentham’s non-discerning child was just a convenient device, serving as a 
minor actor within the architectures of a larger machinery.  It is with some 
irony then, that despite the small role it occupied, this child figure would 
eventually become the agent of a new moral order.  With one hand extended 
into that cylindrical box – into an interior governed by number, lot and 
probabilities – childhood soon found itself subject to a new set of rules and 
regulated by a new order of discourse.   
The instruments of moral formation were refashioned and massified for a 
new age.  As a result, the soul of the child became the object of modern 
examination, instruction and enquiry.  Subjected to a far more intense regime 
of petty ordeals than hitherto, this modern soul became so well regulated, and 
achieved such an elevated position that it eventually developed into a ‘prison 
of the body’.39  Here Foucault draws from Nietzsche who observed how the 
soul once ‘looked contemptuously upon the body’, 40  where all bodily 
diversions were suspected for their potential to corrupt the soul.  With 
modernity this all changed; the problem today is its opposite.  The soul has 
been so minutely prescribed indeed, that the body should now regard the soul 
with great suspicion.  Of course, we no longer speak of this soul as a ‘soul’, as 
we once did.  It goes by other names.  The modern soul is otherwise known as 
‘your true self’ or ‘your inner being’.   
The popular phrase, be true to yourself, serves as a violent constraint.  Those 
who attempt to obey this command search in vain for their inner self (which 
must, of course, remain elusive).  They satisfy themselves with imported ideas 
that provide a sense of depth.  Their inner self arrives as a constructed and 
constraining illusion. 
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Educated Bodies 
 
Critics of modern examination are often its most deceptive representatives.   
They falsely depict examination as a mechanistic and lowly tool.  As a blunt 
instrument, examination is said to trample over human life and prevent human 
flourishing.  If we fail to resist its onslaught, examination will overcome every 
aspect of education with its reductive logic.  Their retrospective accounts tell 
the story of examination as if it were a history of repressions.  Even those 
histories that have a tendency to mimic the archives from which they draw – 
leaving us over-burdened with facts, and light on analysis – tend to reinforce 
the view that examination has spread almost everywhere.  The facts are said to 
speak for themselves.  We believe ourselves crushed, our life force running 
away through the drainage channels that examination has foreseen to 
construct.   
* 
The good educator resists examination.  Though few would remove 
examination entirely, many such educators seek to reduce its variously 
‘corrupting’ effects.  Here, resisting examination becomes a matter of 
allegiance to higher (rarely articulated) educational ideals.  If only we could 
escape some of its influence, if only we could remove aspects of its imprint 
from the child.  If only we could examine a little less and educate a little 
more…  These sentiments are misconceived.  The logic of examination 
constitutes modern schooling as its ontological condition. 1   Modern 
examination was not imposed on educational institutions as if from above: it is 
part of their very being.  As such, it cannot be removed or meaningfully 
resisted without dismantling everything else.   
* 
The modern school arose through the accumulation of various dispersed 
techniques.2  These techniques amassed between the late eighteenth century 
and the start of the twentieth, to form the distinctly functional architectures of 
modern schooling.  This rise of mass schooling accompanied the formation of 
modern states that claimed to be serving the interests of their citizens.  
Newfound freedoms were established and old social ties (remnants of 
feudalism) broke down.  It was important, under conditions such as these, that 
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citizens were educated to use their freedom correctly.  States came to depend 
on sophisticated techniques that would enable them to construct the subjects 
they required.  This momentous formative endeavour, involving the material 
formation of an entire citizenry, no less, was taken up in part by the modern 
school.  Early techniques focused on the training and regulation of bodies, and 
through the manipulation of these bodies they constructed the modern soul.  
Whilst this soul has no vital or inextinguishable essence, it is no illusion either, 
being the product of its material reality.  Unlike the soul of Christian theology, 
it was not born in sin, but was induced through various methods of 
punishment, supervision and constraint.   
* 
To those who defend the individual, here is a warning:  Those modern men, 
women and children you endeavour to free are already the product of 
something much greater than themselves.  Their souls, your quarry, are ‘the 
effect and instrument of a political anatomy’ that is larger in extent than the 
reach of your compassion.3  You seek to protect the sanctity of the individual?  
You are defending a phantom! 
* 
!Part I from Benign Violence: Education in and Beyond the Age of Reason by Ansgar Allen published by 
Palgrave Macmillan in 2014 – pre-copyedited version.!
The technocrats who devised modern schooling employed techniques that 
would shape individuality in such a way that those concerned were isolated 
from one another but open to the influence of government.  Here, modern 
examination in its various forms operated as a meticulous divider.  Later 
contributions added a focus on interpersonal examining techniques.  These 
would construct the modern soul as a self-regulating consciousness.   
The overall strategy, as Michel Foucault once observed, was to combine 
dividing practices and practices of exclusion (where ‘the subject is either 
divided inside himself or divided from others’), with techniques that trained 
the child to ‘turn him- or herself into a subject’.4  These techniques enabled the 
individual to recognise externally defined traits within the self and then act 
upon them.   
As a material reality, the modern soul depends on concepts and domains of 
analysis within which it can be determined.  It relies on the carving out of 
categories ranging from more general ideas – ‘psyche, subjectivity, personality, 
consciousness, etc.’5 – to more child-specific notions – the troubled child, the 
child of promise, the borderline child, and so on.  Examination performs a 
central role here in forming the frame of reference that informs the child, so 
that he or she may live within the scope it defines.   
* 
Together with schools, modern examinations evolved from practices that were 
developed at a number of sites and were influenced by a range of political, 
social, historical, and psychological narratives.  These practices were not 
variations on a single theme.  They should be viewed as acts of differential 
creation.6   
I have to say this, really.  It forms part of my methodological mantra – one 
I inherit from the genealogist, a creature born of Nietzsche7 and nurtured by 
Foucault.8  The genealogist may be defined by the position he or she takes with 
respect to the following three terms:  Origin: A genealogist should not pursue 
origins, as if the essence of things might somehow be discovered.  Descent:  The 
denial of absolute origins is linked to the idea of descent; every historical 
beginning is simply a fabrication derived from that which preceded it.  
Beginnings are nothing but events that have acquired a certain artificial status 
in retrospect.  Thus, we should not search for beginnings.  Instead, we should 
look for the ‘myriad events’ that coordinate to form the heterogeneity of 
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descent.9  Emergence:  The emergence of historical events is to be understood as 
the product of confrontation.  An historical event is the outcome of ‘a 
particular state of forces’.10   ‘Consequently, no one is responsible for an 
emergence; no one can glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice’.11  
How the genealogist is able to function in this confrontational landscape 
will be explored in more detail later.  For the moment it is sufficient to turn 
directly to Nietzsche for a description of the terrain: 
 
…there is…no more important principle for all types of history than the following 
one…that there is a world of difference between the reason for something coming 
into existence in the first place and the ultimate use to which it is put, its actual 
application and integration into a system of goals; that anything which exists, once 
it has somehow come into being, can be reinterpreted in the service of new 
intentions, repossessed, repeatedly modified to a new use by a power superior to it; 
that everything which happens in the organic world is part of a process of 
overpowering, mastering, and that, in turn, all overpowering and mastering is a 
reinterpretation, a manipulation, in the course of which the previous ‘meaning’ and 
‘aim’ must necessarily be obscured or completely effaced… all aims, all uses are 
merely signs indicating that a will to power has mastered something less powerful 
than itself and impressed the meaning of a function upon it in accordance with its 
own interests.  So the entire history of a ‘thing’, an organ, a custom may take the 
form of an extended chain of signs, of ever-new interpretations and manipulations, 
whose causes do not themselves necessarily stand in relation to one another, but 
merely follow and replace one another arbitrarily and according to circumstance.  
The ‘development’ of a thing, a custom, an organ does not in the least resemble a 
progressus towards a goal, and even less the logical and shortest progressus, the most 
economical in terms of expenditure of force and cost. Rather, this development 
assumes the form of the succession of the more or less far-reaching, more or less 
independent processes of overpowering which affect it -including also in each case 
the resistance marshalled against these processes, the changes of form attempted 
with a view to defence and reaction, and the results of these successful 
counteractions.  The form is fluid, but the ‘meaning’ even more so.12 
 
All this repels the fervent historian, who retreats to the archives in pursuit of 
historical truth.  It implies a mode of historical enquiry that would be just as 
disordered as the history it perceives.  The historian prefers calm, subscribing 
to the hope that insistent diligence and the factual accumulations scholarly 
endeavour affords, will generate a fairly cohesive account of the object in 
question.  I hope you will be reassured: I have no such ambitions.  There is no 
desire to ‘fill in the blanks’ here.  Ignoring the convention where historical 
accounts are measured against the completeness of the picture they construct 
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and all limitations are openly confessed by way of an apology to the reader, I 
focus on just two institutional sites without expressing regret for the inevitable 
limitations of my analysis.  These two institutions will be contextualised, but 
only to a degree.13  And I will generalise without undue restraint.  My principle 
objective is for a confrontation.  It is to engage with my chosen target; the 
‘relations of power’14 Foucault once spoke of.   
* 
The purpose of this history is largely rhetorical.  It has been devised to cast 
doubt on the present.  Even a quick survey of the development of modern 
examination can, in my view, lead us to suspect the direction of contemporary 
reform efforts, however well-intended they may be.  A history such as this 
should break down the current tendency in education to adjudicate between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ examining practices, between those examining practices that 
are seen as oppressive, impersonal, and excessively mechanistic and those that 
are celebrated for their flexibility and attention to the needs of the child.  Both 
traditions of assessment (mechanistic and humanistic) have as their object the 
construction of selves amenable to government.  And so, the rejection of one 
tradition of examination in favour of another may do little to emancipate us 
from the effects of power.  My claim is this: our entrapment on the horns of 
this false dilemma occurred at the emergence of modern examination.  Indeed, 
the complex descent of the techniques that now afflict us, should be traced 
back to their constitution in the nineteenth century 
The institutions within which these practices were collected and developed 
have long since disappeared.  The early nineteenth century ‘monitorial school’ 
and the mid nineteenth century ‘moral training school’ were, nevertheless, 
highly influential.  These two short-lived institutions deserve far greater 
attention than they generally receive, having taken part in the transformation 
of practices from which modern schooling and examination were built.   
The examining practices they employed were never simply oppressive, even 
in their darkest moments.  They were, indeed, highly productive in 
constructing biddable subjects for the benefit of the modern state.  In other 
words – and to repeat myself – the advance of modern examination did not 
trample the interior of the child.  Even those examining techniques that seek 
to listen to the child – techniques that are celebrated for their benign attention 
to the unique needs of the individual learner – are not innocent of power 
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interests and their effects.  They are tied within a system of moral coercion that 
operates through carefully devised modes of examination, based on 
relationships that are often warm and kindly in manner.   
* 
My focus – a symptom of my place of birth – is the early development of the 
two schools in Britain.  These two school types were global in their reach.  
Monitorial schools spread throughout Europe and across the Atlantic to the 
Americas, 15  followed by moral training schools, which can be traced to 
colonies such as Nova Scotia.16   These institutions were devised for the 
wretched and dispossessed.  Many feared that the urban poor, drawn to the 
cities in ever-larger numbers, were becoming ungovernable.  When 
transplanted across the Atlantic to the Americas, these institutional techniques 
were applied to other ‘difficult’ groups including the natives of that continent 
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who were bereft, or so it was assumed, living as they did without the benefits 
of modernity.17 
These new institutional sites were contrasted to the disordered instruction 
already available in the slum.  Run by social inferiors, scratching together a 
living on the margins of society, the private adventure or dame schools were 
judged too irregular and nomadic to function.  Even worse, they were potential 
breeding grounds of vice and immorality. 18   Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth, 
secretary to the embryo Ministry of Education, complained that a great 
number of schoolmasters still ‘plying their trade’ in 1841 undertook this work 
either because they were ‘incapacitated by age or infirmity’ or because they had 
‘failed in all other attempts to procure a livelihood’.19  Twenty years later a 
government commission lamented that these establishments were still 
springing up like ‘mushroom growth’.20  Indeed, it was felt that these places 
revealed a lot about ‘what kind of education finds favour with that particular 
class of parents’.21   
For a flavour of their decrepit construction, picture this particularly 
‘miserable’ establishment, located ‘at the top of a very steep and broken 
staircase’ where the ‘chief text-book seemed to be a kitten’.   Again we are told 
that those working in this environment selected their profession ‘because they 
have failed in other pursuits, or because, as in the case of widows, they have 
been unexpectedly left in a state of destitution’.22  As one commissioner 
famously declared: ‘none are too old, too poor, too ignorant, too feeble, too 
sickly, too unqualified in any way or every way, to regard themselves, and to be 
regarded by others, as unfit for school-keeping’.23  The implications are clear 
enough: the poor could not be trusted with overseeing their own instruction.  
Those institutions they did manage to establish were ‘of the most temporary 
kind’24 and were not fit for purpose.  The depraved masses required something 
rather more systematic and worthy than they were able to achieve without 
assistance from above.   
Gradually, the responsibility for public education was adopted by large 
philanthropic organisations, and following that, by the state.  Having witnessed 
the birth of modern schooling, this period could be viewed as a triumph of 
educational inclusion.  A chain of events unfolded here that would ultimately 
result in the guarantee that all children will have access to a formal education.  
‘Education for all!’ – that is our great inheritance, this is our modern 
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educational achievement.  And yet, from the outset the newly invented 
institutions of schooling were based on practices of division; they generated 
fresh inequalities.  They were, moreover, instruments of government.  Children 
were institutionalised.  They were made available for inspection, rendered 
legible and open to governmental calculation.  These schools functioned as 
vast educational laboratories.  They were founded for the production of 
knowledge and the proliferation of governmental techniques.   
 
Each mode of schooling – monitorial and moral training – developed its own 
unique cluster of examining practices.  In the monitorial school, examination 
was integrated within a disciplinary and functional architecture.  As such, it 
cannot be understood apart from the entire ensemble of practices that made 
up this institution.  Examination in the moral training school adopted a very 
different approach; it was based on the construction of intimate relations, 
between teachers and pupils.  And yet, it too relied on a larger functional 
organisation of space.  The subsequent history of examination is a history of 
the relationship between these two basic approaches – one disciplinary, the 
other pastoral.  They became entangled and generated derivatives, leading to 
the complex array of inscription devices and pastoral controls that constitute 
education today.   
* 
Schools and prisons often resemble one another.  They share common 
histories and techniques.  These techniques swiftly become so banal that we 
are no longer arrested by their grotesque presence.  To take a contemporary 
example: children who use fingerprint scanners to pay for lunch, no longer 
balk at the introduction of scanners elsewhere.   
* 
As the eighteenth century drew to a close there was a transformation in 
systems of punishment.  Formerly public, and often brutal, the occasional 
display of retribution issued by the monarch and inflicted on the body of the 
condemned was withdrawn from open view.  Punishment was dragged behind 
the prison gates so as to become an institutional and private concern.  The new 
correctional order drew upon diffuse technologies distributed across prisons, 
hospitals, barracks and schools.  Across these sites was developed a new mode 
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of power that Foucault labelled: disciplinary.  Foucault describes its many 
components throughout Discipline and Punish25 – in which he traces a transition 
from sporadic and vengeful punishments to regular and measured disciplinary 
techniques.  These employed a far more advanced and better-calibrated 
economy of pain than the pillory was ever able to afford. 
Certain formulations outlined Discipline and Punish have since become 
commonplace.  Scholars have claimed to find ‘disciplinary power’ everywhere.  
It has been depicted as a ubiquitous feature of modernity that has plagued us 
ever since it was developed in the early nineteenth century.  Its fossilised 
structures are said to still influence schooling today.  From this perspective, 
anything mechanical or reductive in appearance can find itself labelled 
‘disciplinary’.26  Disciplinary power is in danger of becoming a vague cypher 
for a form of subjection we are no longer able to identify precisely, because it 
has been applied to so many contexts in so many ways.  It has become a 
promiscuous concept. 
* 
Jeremy Bentham’s circular prison design, known as the ‘panopticon,’ is the 
metaphor typically used to represent disciplinary power.27  As a metaphor, it 
has some value, demonstrating how a disciplinary architecture could support 
the automatic functioning of power, where inmates become the bearers of the 
system that subjects them.  Unable to discover precisely when they are being 
observed, inmates act as if observation were constant.   
By referring to this metaphor, by emphasising the ‘panoptic gaze,’ we avoid 
any reduction of disciplinary technique to notions of simple domination, for 
disciplinary power is said to operate through the dispositions and hence 
‘freedoms’ of those it moulds.  We should remember, however, that this prison 
design was no more than the ‘diagram of a mechanism of power,’ one that has 
been ‘reduced to its ideal form,’ and by virtue of this reduction, details are 
lost.28  Moreover, it exaggerates the principle of visibility.29  Disciplinary power 
is about much more than optical surveillance.  
* 
The power of discipline is one of analysis, based upon its ability to locate and 
separate that which is to be studied.  As Foucault put it: ‘one of the primary 
objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique’.  It is for analytic 
purposes that discipline ‘arrests or regulates movements,’ clears up ‘confusion,’ 
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dissipates ‘compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in 
unpredictable ways,’ and establishes ‘calculated distributions’. 30   The 
production of knowledge is an intrinsic part of its technique. 
* 
Partitioned individuals, a prerequisite for disciplinary analysis, are generated by 
various means.  These include the basic spatial distribution of bodies, which is 
physical but can also be represented conceptually such as through the 
distribution of inmates in cells or the register that records their arrival; a careful 
breakdown and coding of bodily movements, such as can be found in the 
sequential gestures of the military parade; the sequencing of activities through 
longer periods of time, which are made visible in documents such as a school 
curriculum; and efforts to coordinate the entire ensemble of bodies through a 
‘composition of forces’.31   When combined, these techniques form the basic 
structure of a disciplinary examination.  Whilst examination becomes through 
this ensemble the strategic hub of disciplinary power, it would be a mistake to 
treat disciplinary examination as if it were the hidden motor or essence of 
disciplinary technique.32  Separated from its networks of associated techniques, 
examination has little specific gravity or strength of its own.   
* 
The monitorial school spread the simple, brute fact of confinement across its 
multiple, intersecting techniques.  In Tennessee, when reviewing efforts to 
institutionalise children of the aboriginal population, it was claimed that 
monitorial teaching ‘relieves that bitterness which otherwise those would feel, 
who have not been accustomed to confinement’.33  This was in 1818. 
Viewed as both economical and effective, the monitorial school promised 
to transform ungovernable groups into useful and productive subjects at 
minimal cost.  As a modern achievement it was raised above vaccination by its 
proponents, for it was said to offer ‘a remedy for the disorders of filth, 
idleness, ignorance, and vice’ that were ‘more fatal,’ even, ‘than the ravages of 
the Small-Pox’.34  In the opinion of one colonial chaplain, this new system of 
education was nothing less than a form of ‘mental vaccination’.35  It was the best 
means of ‘arriving at the cure of those evils which at once disgrace society, and 
deprive it of many who might form its most active and useful members’.36  It 
was able to ‘correct those morbid humours which so corrupt the morals of 
society’.37  Naturally, since both mental vaccination and social cure were now 
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possible, the ‘greatest discoveries, heretofore made for the improvement of 
human life, sink into comparative insignificance’.38   
These were the views of the professed first architect Dr Andrew Bell and 
his expanding band of enthusiasts.  Initially devised for orphans at a military 
asylum in Madras (founded in 1789), the system was imported with the return 
of Bell to Britain in 1797.  Issuing from a rival denomination, Joseph Lancaster 
devised a remarkably similar system and with the support of their respective 
philanthropic societies and religious orders,39  these school systems spread 
throughout kingdom and empire.  
The Madras school run by Bell aimed to rescue mixed-race children, 
orphans of British officers, from the ‘habits of wretched depravity’ in which 
they had been ‘educated by their mothers’.40  
 
It has long been said, that the half-cast children of this country show an evident 
inferiority in the talents of the head, the qualities of the mind, and the virtues of the 
heart.  I will not enter into the question, How far government, or climate, and 
perhaps complexion as connected with climate, influence the character of the 
human race.  Whatever may be the opinion on these heads, I believe that the effect 
of education will not be denied… I think I see, in the very first maxims which the 
mothers of these children instil into their infant minds, the source of every corrupt 
practice, and an infallible mode of forming a degenerate race.41 
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As a devout educationalist Bell set out unperturbed to form his pupils in 
‘habits of diligence, industry, veracity, and honesty’ as well as ‘instructing them 
in useful knowledge’.42  In 1839, following multiple experiments with the 
techniques he promoted, this educational optimism lives on in the teaching 
manuals of the monitorial school:   
 
However untoward a child may be found on first entering the school, no violence 
of temper, no perversity of disposition, no depravity of principle, no sluggishness of 
intellect, should discourage the hope of effecting a decided change, through the 
Divine blessing, on a patient and persevering application of the regulations 
prescribed.43 
 
My contemporaries and peers maintain a similar commitment to education.  
They hold it to be a worthy, transformative, and potentially life-changing 
endeavour.  We agents of subjection take great pride in calling ourselves 
educationalists. 
* 
For want of proper assistants, who when drawn from the local population, 
were felt to be poor in quality, Bell was forced to design a system that he could 
operate alone.  One solitary master would conduct the school, transforming 
‘stubborn, perverse, and obstinate’ boys into an ‘annual crop of good and 
useful subjects.’  This would be achieved by conducting the school ‘through 
the medium of the scholars themselves.’44  Dependable students, appropriately 
trained, would monitor and supervise their peers.  Supervision was devolved 
within a tight scheme, across concerted systems of observation; it was spun 
through a network that was supported by its own interlocking web.  This 
economy of power was designed to cope with the lower orders of society 
which, it was presumed, required assistance in running their own affairs.  
These lower orders were to be an experimental population.  Through the 
manipulation of their offspring they would become accustomed to a strategy 
of government that operated not from above but from below and within.  The 
masses were to be instructed in procedures deemed appropriate for regulating 
and governing themselves.   
Along with Lancaster who believed that ‘coercion’ is ‘the most disgusting 
word in the British vocabulary,’ 45  Bell asserted the mildness of his new 
technique.  The moderation of force was adopted as a key principle; replacing a 
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costly, sporadic, uncalculated use of violence with a far more carefully applied, 
constantly felt economy of power (using ‘means as much more effectual as 
they are more lenient than usual’46).  The problem with ‘a system of terror’ and 
the ‘fear of punishment’ is that neither is ‘so constant nor so certain an 
operation’.47  If ‘newly-invented racks or screws, or whips, or cords’ had been 
placed into his hands, Bell declares, the ‘experiment should have perished in 
embryo’.  Instead he devised a minute ‘division of labour’ which left the master 
with the ‘simple and easy charge of directing, regulating, and controlling his 
intellectual and moral machine’.48  Lancaster agreed: school keeping should no 
longer be a ‘toilsome employ’ if the school is ‘conducted by a regular system’.49   
* 
In Nürnberg clocks have been striking the quarter hour since the sixteenth 
century.50  With modernity, minutes became valuable.  In the monitorial school 
time was to be maximised.  The experience of time (its passing) was intensified 
by the maximal use of the slightest moment, ‘as if time, in its very 
fragmentation, were inexhaustible’.51  
A ‘constant and perpetual attention’ was desired of pupils.  Usually this was 
limited by ‘such a number of boys’ as the master could ‘at once have under his 
eye and within his reach’.52  But the gaze of the teacher was only one of many 
devices.  Constant activity was assured, or so we are told, by an ‘uninterrupted 
succession of short and easy lessons’, and through the ‘perpetual presence and 
never-ceasing vigilance of its numerous overseers’ the students themselves, 
who helped ‘preclude idleness, ensure diligence, prevent ill behaviour of every 
sort, and almost supersede the necessity of punishment’.53   
Discipline was the key to this ‘simple, easy, pleasant, expeditious, and 
economical’ system: ‘as in an army, discipline’ was ‘the first, second and third 
essential’.54  We are told that a single master carrying out Bell’s methods could 
‘without difficulty, conduct ten contiguous schools, each consisting of a 
thousand scholars’ for the ‘school teaches itself’.55  Such machinery would not 
run in perpetuity without periodic maintenance: a ‘scrutinising eye must 
pervade the whole machine.’56  Its workings would be adjusted ‘from time to 
time, so as to get the most out of it, with the least possible friction’.  The 
‘smoothness, exactitude, and machine like regularity’ of the school would then 
be assured.57 
* 
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The school assembles in a single large room or hall, with windows at least six 
feet from the floor to prevent distraction.  At one end is the master’s desk, 
occupying the middle are forms (benches) and desks fixed firmly into the 
ground.58  Upon entry each pupil proceeds to his or her unique number 
printed on the school wall, where vacant spaces describe absences at a glance.59  
Once called to their seats, the hierarchy of classes and functionaries becomes 
manifest.  Each allotted spot is a relative position within a route of progression 
that operates throughout the school, from the front, nearest the master’s desk, 
to the rear.  All monitors have their stations, a general monitor of order 
standing on a high stool at the lower end of the room, and the monitors of 
classes standing above the seated majority to the right of their respective 
subjects.60  Through these arrangements in space, a disordered mass becomes a 
legible entity.  The definition of each child, including his or her role within the 
school, is the direct result of his or her position within this conceptual and 
functional grid.  A norm of progression is defined, constructing the terms in 
which pupils are to view themselves.  Perched on the benches in front is their 
past, on the benches behind, their future. 
* 
At the end of each bench is a standard (a kind of notice board).  Here class 
marks are displayed, forming a conceptual grid that defines the class and each 
individual within it.  There are smaller boards called ‘telegraphs’ that turn freely 
on a rod, the lower end of which is fixed into the top of the standard just 
referred to.  Inscribed on one side is the number of the class, on the other the 
letters E. X.  By displaying these letters class monitors inform the General 
Monitor when they have examined the slates.  This procedure assures that 
testing is carried out on a regular basis.61   
Even the precise movement of the child, seated with his or her 
companions along the regimented order of the bench, is defined according to a 
breakdown of bodily mechanics.  Habits of ‘prompt obedience’ are to be 
‘universally established’.  With children who are ‘restless, volatile, and unused 
to restraint, mechanical motions of the body, as they are at once easily 
understood, and readily performed, afford the best means of inculcating these 
habits’.  No teacher should rest until ‘he has brought every child to sit, stand, 
speak, or be silent, on the instant of the command being given’.62  
!Part I from Benign Violence: Education in and Beyond the Age of Reason by Ansgar Allen published by 
Palgrave Macmillan in 2014 – pre-copyedited version.!
Positions of the Scholars, a popular illustration in monitorial school manuals, 
depicts a numbered frieze of bodily movements where each figure corresponds 
to an associated command.  Upon arrival at the writing desk, each pupil ‘places 
his finger on the slate screw, and stops without turning’ (figure eleven).  When 
all have ‘quitted the aisles, the monitor of order says ‘front’ at which ‘they all 
turn and face him’ (figure eight). At the command ‘in’ they ‘spring in’ (figure 
one).  This continues, through figures two, four, five, two again, six and so on, 
and on, until they are eventually instructed to quit their desks, put on their hats 
(figure ten), and depart.63 
* 
These were idealised schemes.  At times their claims to efficacy are almost 
mythological.  Bell reports that the monitorial schoolmaster has at his disposal 
‘the hundred hands of Briareus, the hundred eyes of Argus, and the wings of 
Mercury’.64  Surely this inflated statement renders suspect all others?  The 
claims made on behalf of the monitorial school would appear to be wanton 
exaggerations.  Even though failures are occasionally documented in the 
annual reports that were collated by the mother societies in Britain, their tone 
is generally pious:  One school in Leith was an ‘offence to the neighbourhood’ 
when first established on account of ‘the uncontrollable rudeness of the 
scholars out of doors, and the noise, insubordination, and misrule that reigned 
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within’.65  After 5 years it was transformed into a paragon of good order.  How 
this was achieved remains unclear.  In a Sheffield school, the account of moral 
rescue for one female pupil (who was ‘violent to the extreme’ and ‘addicted to 
fighting, swearing, and almost every thing that was bad’) takes the form of a 
sudden religious conversion, following exposure to scripture. 66   Clearly, 
monitorial techniques were far from uniform and employed devices other than 
disciplinary ones.  These examples do not point, however, to a fundamental 
error in Foucault’s disciplinary theory.  For Foucault, disciplinary institutions 
are just like any other regime of power that has failed to achieve totality: these 
institutions are always-already failing, they are leaking at the edges.   To reject 
disciplinary institutions as figments, as little more than the organisational 
fantasies of their architects, to say they never existed in this perfect form, and 
to call for research that finds out what ‘really happened’, misses the point.  
Indeed, as a non-total system of power discipline draws strength from 
multiplication and dispersal, and not from isolated cases of perfection or 
conquest.  The complex devices of the monitorial school were far more than 
the educational dreams of overzealous pedagogues, eulogised in teaching 
manuals.  These contrivances reflect a logic of design that extended well 
beyond the monitorial school, becoming too widely dispersed to be ignored. 
* 
Within the monitorial system and its arrangement of bodies, each scholar 
‘finds his own level, not only in his class, but in the ranks of the school, being 
promoted or degraded from place to place, or class to class, according to his 
proficiency’. 67   The steps were deliberately small.  Even the differences 
between a class and its class monitor are modest.  The monitors (who are 
pupils too) should know ‘no more than what is level to the capacities of their 
pupils.’  They will, as a result, ‘lose no time in teaching what is beyond the 
comprehension of their scholars’.68  Attention to the surface features of the 
pupil cohort, and not to its depths, was the epitome of good teaching.   
* 
Any boy ‘lame, or deformed’ or limited in his faculties can be rejected if he will 
become a ‘burden’ to the overall machinery of the school.69  Those admitted 
must perform their function as a component part, where the basic drive is to 
‘obtain pre-eminence’ in the class and then ‘to rise above it and be promoted 
to a superior; and especially not to sink below it, and degraded to an inferior 
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class’.70  Promotion to a higher class only occurs when high rank has been held 
for some time, and is only permanent if the pupil can quickly rise to the middle 
of the new, higher class.  Otherwise the pupil returns to the former group.  
Demotion occurs when a pupil fails to perform well.  However, if high rank in 
the inferior class is maintained, the pupil is not ‘doomed to permanent 
degradation’.  A flavour of demotion is deemed sufficient to secure ‘redoubled 
exertion’.71   
Each class is itself divided into pairs of tutors and pupils (not to be 
confused with the monitors in overall charge72).  The superior half of the class 
tutors the inferior half, and the seats taken along the bench reflect this:  The 
lowest member of the class sits beside the highest, the next lowest beside the 
next highest, and so on all the way along.  Achieving the status of tutor is an 
honour, but the tutor is responsible for a double fate.  He must protect his 
pupil from demotion by teaching well, whilst retaining his higher rank by being 
proficient at what is taught, for ‘what disgrace attaches to the boy who, by his 
negligence, is degraded into a pupil, and falls perhaps to be tutored by his late 
pupil, promoted to be a tutor’.73  The overall effect of perpetual readjustment 
is that ‘every boy in every class’ finds himself fully occupied, his exertions 
maximised.74   
* 
Ranking depends upon an archive of past efforts.  It begins with the individual 
scholar who ‘registers for himself all his daily operations in the last page of his 
copy, or ciphering book’.  This is later compared with what he did the day 
before and what others of similar standing achieved.  There are weekly, 
monthly, quarterly and annual reviews.  The page, in which ‘these registers are 
kept, is ruled into thirty-one parallel lines, so as to last a month, and into as 
many columns as there are daily entries to be made’.  The teacher also 
compiles a more general daily record containing the ‘number of lessons read; 
pages or lines gone over in these lessons; and hours thus employed’.75  In 
Lancaster’s system, the monitor employed as ‘inspector-general of reading’ 
examines samples of each class on a periodic basis, getting round to ‘some 
hundreds’ in a few days.76  This documentary trail ensures that each pupil has a 
‘permanent testimony’ to ‘merit and demerit’.  Even if a pupil is ‘overlooked in 
passing,’ the archive retains the relevant facts for later perusal.77  
* 
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The ‘black book’ is seen as ‘the most powerful operator’.  All misdemeanours 
(including the failure to report misdemeanours) are recorded here.  The 
schoolmaster then decides if an ‘immediate reprimand, or threat’ is suitable, or 
whether the offence should become part of the weekly ritual of punishment.  
‘Abstract lectures are little attended to, and still less understood, by children.  
To reach their minds and touch their hearts, you must give a visible shape and 
tangible form to your doctrine’.78  The reprimand passes through the body to 
the soul under construction.   
Lancaster presents himself as a tireless innovator in this domain.  Though 
he reputedly had ‘a perfect horror’ of the rod,79 this came more from dislike of 
its tendency to arbitrary violence than its cruelty as such.  He preferred a more 
regular economy of pain: modes of correction must be ‘inflicted, so as to give 
as much uneasiness to the delinquents, without disturbing the mind or temper 
of the master’.80 
Instruments of punishment include ‘a wooden log’ placed round the neck, 
which ‘serves as a pillory.’  The neck ‘is not pinched or closely confined – it is 
chiefly burthensome by the manner in which it incumbers the neck, when the 
delinquent turns to the right or the left… Thus he is confined to sit in his proper 
position, and go on with his work.’  ‘When logs are unavailing, it is common to 
fasten the legs of offenders together with wooden shackles’ and order them to 
walk round the hall until they are ‘glad to sue for liberty’.  If this fails, ‘the left 
hand is tied behind the back, or wooden shackles fastened from elbow to 
elbow.’  Sometimes ‘the legs are tied together’ preventing boys from wandering 
about.  ‘Occasionally boys are put in a sack, or in a basket, suspended to the 
roof of the school, in sight of all the pupils, who frequently smile at the birds 
in the cage.’  This punishment ‘is one of the most terrible’ and is to be 
especially ‘dreaded by the monitors.’   
Frequent offenders are ‘yoked together, sometimes by a piece of wood that 
fastens round all their necks’ and forced to parade the school walking 
backwards’, which makes them ‘pay very great attention to their footsteps.’  
Others are ‘dressed up with labels’ describing the offence and are led round 
the school by two boys proclaiming the fault.81  Dirty boys are cleaned before 
the whole school by a girl; truants are tied to a post; the most ‘incorrigible’ are 
‘tied up in a blanket, and left to sleep at night on the floor’.82  In punishing by 
confinement after school, the master’s attendance can be avoided ‘by tying 
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them to the desks.’  Those who adopt ‘a singing tone in reading’ are ridiculed 
with a special costume; others are made to wear the ‘fools coat.’  A lazy boy 
will have a pillow fetched ‘and placed on the desk for him to lay his head on, as 
if asleep, in the face of the school’; a ‘boy wandering from his seat may be 
placed under a hen coop’ – idle boys are rocked in a cradle.83  All devices are to 
be applied with a cool, calculated temper.  Despite their severity these are 
carefully measured techniques.  They are corrective in function as the desired 
behaviour can be deduced from the punishment chosen. 
* 
A parallel ‘system of encouragement’ takes us away from these economies of 
bodily discomfort.  Paper tickets are awarded for good work, and a monitor of 
tickets records these awards in a book.  Accumulated tickets can be exchanged 
for prizes of varying value, from a separate monitor.  There are several orders 
of merit, and those who reach a higher rank wear badges on a daily basis until 
forfeited by bad behaviour.  We are told that pupils are ‘more affected by their 
loss than coercion’.84   Teachers and assistants also receive pecuniary and 
honorary awards, and ‘silver medals’ of varying size are ‘distributed in the 
annual examination by the president’. 85   Many other duties have their 
respective officers and systems of encouragement.  There is a ‘sub-usher and 
usher’ who ‘watch over the whole’, a monitor of slates, of cleanliness, of 
absences, and so on until every duty is discharged.86   
* 
Perhaps these paper tickets, prizes and medals will not distract you from the 
image of pupils yoked together, or boys confined in a sack.  If it all sounds 
rather oppressive and alien to your finer sensibilities, do not be fooled.  Taken 
as a whole, these techniques were profoundly constructive.  We are their heirs, 
you and I.  New ways of being, new understandings of the self were being 
formed here.   
* 
As an overall framework, disciplinary technique should not be misread as if it 
were the product of larger oppressions, such as the overbearing state, to name 
an obvious and frequently invoked example.  Disciplinary technique evidently 
pre-dates state education in England.  Of course state institutions such as the 
Elementary Schools of the late nineteenth century later adopted some of these 
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devices.  But the state, of which we hear so much, is always limited by its 
dependence on techniques ‘which it did not invent and whose consequences it 
cannot fully control’.87   
In understanding the workings of power we must avoid the phantom of an 
abstract oppressor.  As Ian Hunter observes, the ‘problem of total 
determination’ only arrives under ‘fantasmatic theoretical circumstances’ that 
generate the abstract categories from which such a ‘problem’ first emerges.88  
The modern governmental state arose ‘not as a new face for the timeless 
struggle between power and self-determination’ but ‘as a circumstantially-
specific amalgam of political instruments’.  These political instruments were of 
diverse provenance, where each arrived with its own specific agenda.  And so, 
rather than ‘expressing the will of the absolutist state or its ruler’, these 
instruments effectively ‘colonized it in the name of a new range of political 
knowledges and imperatives’.89   
* 
In educational circles, examination is the exemplary case of an abstract 
oppressor.  It has become a specter in the eyes of its critics, one that stalks the 
corridors of the school, breathing its heavy stench into the classroom, 
obliterating all good intention, reducing teacher and student alike to shadows 
of their former selves.   
The material presence of examination is far more diffuse, though, than its 
critics allow.  In the monitorial school it was distributed widely, influencing 
bodily location and movement, rendering visible an otherwise obscured 
process of learning and effort.  Examination was produced by the system of 
telegraphs that ensured it was taking place with coordinated regularity as part 
of every lesson; the keeping of records by pupils in the backs of their books at 
the end of each day and month, allowing comparisons between pupils and 
within pupils across time; the consequent distribution of scholars along the 
bench, pairing tutor and tutee in cooperative rivalry; the system that decided 
whether temporary demotion would become permanent; the records of overall 
class activity found both in a book and on public display; and finally, the 
monthly, quarterly and annual reviews as well as systems of recognition and 
remuneration.  Examination was a constant and diffuse presence in the overall 
economy of the school.  All practices depended on this ability to locate, 
describe, record and compare, to raise up what was formerly ‘below the 
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threshold of description’,90 placing individuals within a ‘network of writing’ 
that would define them.91  
Occasionally, Foucault encourages us to extend the reach of disciplinary 
power to the present when he remarks:  ‘It has always been and still is an 
intrinsic element of the disciplines.’ Examination ‘is still caught up in 
disciplinary technology’.92  He does not, however, trace its development from 
the nineteenth century to the present as it appeared to him in 1975, leaving us 
with little more than these enigmatic claims.  It is worth asking whether 
examination has indeed endured to the present day in the form above 
described.  Does examination retain its disciplinary function in contemporary 
pedagogic practice?  Or was examination in the monitorial school so specific 
to a particular organization of space and hierarchy that when the monitorial 
school dissolved, so did its disciplinary examination?   
When considering these questions, it must be remembered that disciplinary 
institutions, in this case monitorial schools, were ‘mixed spaces’ that were both 
real and ideal in their constitution.93  Examination, in its disciplinary form, can 
still endure in the latter rarefied form even if many details of a material 
structure have long since departed.  As an early nineteenth century device, it 
also sits at the birth of the human sciences, at the dawn of partitioned, 
scientifically measurable, normalized humankind.  In this sense disciplinary 
power is assured a continuing legacy.  Its associated disciplinary knowledges 
along with the examining experts they produced, are still in place in one form 
or another.  At a very basic level, examination still renders the invisible visible, 
and situates the governed subject in a relative scheme.  It was though, only one 
technique amongst many.  If disciplinary-examination does indeed extend to 
the present, this must surely be in a highly revised form.   
Modern examination has at least one other major nineteenth century 
precursor.  This antecedent technique produced a far more intimate regime of 
inspection, achieving a pastoral symbiosis that tied teacher to pupil in a pact of 
mutual salvation.  It was at this point that school examination developed 
confessional attributes.  The legacy of this pastoral symbiosis for the 
functioning of examination today is just as significant, if not more so, than the 
legacy one might attribute to its more easily identifiable, disciplinary 
companion. 
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A Child’s Interior 
 
The spectacle of street life in nineteenth century Glasgow inspired David 
Stow, son of a merchant, to confront the urban barbarities he witnessed whilst 
walking through the city.  Stow decided that the fallen multitudes of the 
industrial age required his assistance.  Charity, he viewed as a ‘mere expedient’, 
believing that the proper solution lay in moral training.  To surmount the 
effects of their poverty the poor must develop the ‘moral stamina’ that would 
‘enable them to resist the viciousness of their surroundings’.148  According to 
Stow, the problems faced by the urban poor were altogether new.  Its 
predecessor, the Scottish peasant, had been far better cared for.  This had little 
to do with the rural parish school and its claustrophobic interior: that 
institution ‘was only one small portion of the machinery by which, under God, 
her peasantry were stamped with a high intellectual and moral character’.149  In 
its wisdom the Scottish Church embedded itself in the rural community, 
providing ‘a minister and a schoolmaster and a staff of elders for every small 
rural parish of perhaps 500 to 1000 souls.’150  And it was the clergyman, we are 
told, who was the principle agent of moral rescue in this context.  The close 
contact afforded by the realities of rural life enabled him to influence the 
family through its religious exercises, and thereby reach the child.  
In the towns and cities where intimate pastoral links were comparatively 
scarce, Stow claims that the ‘natural tendency… is to evil’.  Unable to rely on 
the support of the wider social environment, the pedagogue must now lay 
claim to ‘the entire child’, taking his or her very being into care.151  Educational 
techniques suited to rural life had no place in the urban context. They could 
not countervail ‘the sympathy of numbers’ – a social force Stow associates with the 
education of the streets.152   
* 
The spatial distribution of the moral training school, for which Stow was the 
acclaimed architect, would assist the schoolmaster in his efforts to lay hold of 
the entire child, to rescue it from a ‘savage, brutalized existence’.153  ‘Pioneers 
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of civilization’ would be required when it came to work of this magnitude.  
These pioneers would run institutions that were able to effect a 
transformation in the child’s interior.  The obstacles faced by those engaged 
with this civilizing mission were prodigious.  Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth, 
perhaps the most eminent nineteenth century proponent of moral schooling, 
recalls his experiences of the urban north, down upon which has ‘floated a 
constant supply of an immigrant semi-savage population, bred on the moors 
of the Pennine Chain’ and in other remote places.  ‘They probably have never 
lived but in a hovel; have never been in the street of a village town; are 
unacquainted with common usages of social life; perhaps never saw a book; 
are bewildered by the rapid motion of crowds; confused in an assemblage of 
scholars.  They have to be taught to stand upright, –to walk without a 
slouching gait, –to sit without crouching like a sheep-dog.’  Their parents ‘are 
almost equally brutish.  They have lived solitary lives in some wild region’ but 
the ‘pressing wants of a growing family have induced them to accept the offer 
of some agent from a mill’.  These are the children schools must ‘civilise and 
Christianise’.   
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According to Kay-Shuttleworth, as they descend from the moors and 
wolds they arrive upon a ‘different kind of brutishness’ already entrenched in 
the ‘most degraded parts of great cities’.  Here the urban child, the “Arab of 
the street”, learns a ‘great deal of evil’ from an already sinking and sunken 
population.  ‘Such children have of late years been netted in shoals, –got into 
schools, –have been won, tamed, and, in some degree taught’.  But these 
efforts were never likely to entirely ‘get rid of the wild, untamed barbarism of 
such children’ and ‘graft’ onto them the ‘civilisation’ they so dearly needed.154   
Driven from the country; degraded in the city; disciplined in school.  Moral 
training must now follow. 
* 
In its civilising mission the moral school introduced a unique configuration of 
architectural and interpersonal techniques to the educational landscape, 
systematising the work of pastoral care for the urban context.  It devised 
strategies that accounted for life exterior to the school and developed for its 
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operations a metaphor of depth.  It intensified the relationship between 
teacher and pupil, working upon the child’s constructed interior.  
This was a major revision to the monitorial approach that depended upon 
comparatively shallow interpersonal relations.  In the monitorial school, 
teachers recruited from the student body were selected not only for their 
reliability, but also for their intellectual equivalence (they were to know ‘no 
more than what is level to the capacities of their pupils’155).  The schoolmaster 
in overall charge also operated at the surface, maintaining the school’s 
complex machinery of bodily manipulation.  In these institutions, access to 
detailed records, accumulated by dispersed examining techniques, provided 
comparatively little in the way of depth; knowledge of each pupil remained 
shallow.  By contrast, the soul of the moral training school teacher was 
selected for its apparent depth.  This teacher was expected to convey some 
kind of indication or impression of the unfathomable depths of the soul.  
Teachers were now expected to be morally profound beings that exhibited in 
their bearing the rich qualities their students were expected to develop.   
* 
Monitorial schools were interior spaces.  They opened to the pavement.156  
Whilst monitorial schools remained focused on their interiors, by gathering 
together large groups of children from the urban poor they nevertheless 
established the urban exterior as a problem space in relation to the school.  The 
exterior now stood in direct contrast to the institutional order within, leading 
pedagogues to wonder how they might negotiate this relation between internal 
discipline and relative chaos without.  This was a problem to which the moral 
training school provided its solution.  It would counteract the effects of this 
exterior by relating it more explicitly to the work of the school.  Strategies 
were devised with an explicit remit to counter the ‘training of the streets’.157  
These strategies would mediate the relationship between exterior and interior 
through a simulacrum of the street, known as the playground.  The objective 
was to stimulate the natural tendencies of children.  This went against the 
monitorial philosophy, which as Lancaster explains, ‘prevents the natural 
!Part I from Benign Violence: Education in and Beyond the Age of Reason by Ansgar Allen published by 
Palgrave Macmillan in 2014 – pre-copyedited version.!
vivacity of children’.158  In the playground, by contrast, it was important to 
encourage the self-expression of children in order to derive moral lessons 
from their conduct.  Through this use of space, children could be 
‘superintended in real life’ where real life was a cipher for the life of the street.  
As a simulated urban exterior, the playground would supplement the ‘unnatural 
restraint of a covered school-room.’  It would enable children to be ‘freely at 
play’ having ‘free scope’ and ‘full vent’ to display their true dispositions, 
revealing traits upon which the teacher would then operate.159   
* 
Do not be deceived by the liberal use of ‘freedom’ and ‘truth’ in these 
descriptions.  The moral training school devised a unique economy of power 
where these terms had specific and local meaning.  The object of schooling 
was to cultivate the moral depth of teacher and child.  In building a regime of 
instruction based on moral depth (or ‘moral force’ as it was later satirized160), 
this school relied on older, pastoral techniques redeveloped for its urban 
context.  Here the moral training school formed part of a wider cultural shift 
where Christian governmental techniques were transformed for application in 
an increasingly secular context. 
Relations were established between teacher and pupil that gave new life 
and fresh meaning to historic Christian devices – techniques seeking to relate 
the congregation or flock, to its pastor or shepherd.  Nineteenth century 
schools drew heavily on religious discourses, where themes of salvation, 
redemption, and fear (relating to a potential fall from grace), were integrated 
within the discourses of modern schooling.  In the American progressive 
tradition, to take just one example, Protestant themes were combined with the 
secular pursuit of reason, science and liberty.161  An increasingly secular age 
was built on religious devices.   
* 
According to Foucault’s tentative genealogy,162 this ‘pastoral power’ originated 
as a governing technique in early Christian institutions.  An arrangement was 
established within the church where certain individuals could, based on their 
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religious eminence, serve others in order to achieve salvation in the next 
world.  This governing regime would not issue commands from above with 
the expectation that obedience would be secured directly and through a 
unilateral relation.  Rather, the exercise of power relied on the willingness of 
the pastor to develop a spirit of self-sacrifice that would guide his daily affairs.  
The pastor would deny himself not in the direct service of an all-powerful god, 
but through indirect means in the service of lower beings.  These beings in 
whose service he would place his soul, were his moral subordinates, the flock.  
To reinforce the connection between pastor and flock, the pastor’s ultimate 
salvation was constructed so that it depended on the success of this 
relationship.   
His attention to the flock was divided between supervising the flock as a 
whole whilst also attending to the unique facets of each individual, however 
ignoble these particulars may be.  This required intimate and confessional 
relationships to be established through which the pastor’s knowledge of the 
individual’s conscience and his ability to direct it could be assured.  Pastoral 
care was not removed and distant, it was coextensive and continuous with life.  
It was linked to a production of truth, the truth of the individual self.   
Even though with the rise of modernity the pastorate lost a great deal of 
its former authority and reach, the techniques it devised spread and multiplied 
outside the ecclesiastical dominion from which they originated.  Its 
individualizing devices were to become successively integrated alongside 
disciplinary mechanisms within the secular Western state.  In this profane 
context the idea of salvation took on different meanings with a series of 
worldly aims taking the place of the religious aims of the traditional pastorate.  
The officials of this newly liberated pastoral power increased, including within 
their orbit the nineteenth century schoolteacher.  Teaching became a form of 
professional sacrifice for the present and future moral, social and educational 
well-being of the pupil.   
Religious themes were not completely obliterated in this progressively 
secular context.  They were still invoked, though in a form that was 
increasingly subordinate to the concerns of a bureaucratic state.  Kay-
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Shuttleworth declared that the schoolteacher would require ‘no small support 
from Christian faith’ to reverse ‘the mental darkness, the stubborn tempers, 
the hopeless spirits, and the vicious habits’ of the pauper child.  This 
demanded a ‘spirit of self-sacrifice and tender concern for well-being’ based 
on a sober understanding of just ‘how degenerate these children are’.  The 
‘men who undertake this work should not set about it in the spirit of 
hirelings’; a moral tether should be established that would bind the subjectivity 
of the teacher to the pupil, establishing a relationship of mutual 
dependence.163  This new relationship represented a ‘significant shift from the 
view that the only interest a teacher might have in a school is the fear of losing 
his situation.  The teacher now had to be imbued with an ethic of service’.164  
An ethic of this sort went far beyond the instrumental link established by 
devices such as the Revised Code of 1862 that set in place a system of 
personal and institutional incentives through what became known as Payment 
by Results.  The pedagogue’s newfound ethic of service would indeed survive 
the eventual repeal of this code, having created a teacher who would associate 
his or her own subjective well-being with the fulfillment or lack of fulfillment 
of his or her pupils.  In other words, the teacher developed an educational 
conscience.  This was a portentous step; a secular educational conscience had 
been constructed through institutional means.   
A conscience of this kind is still in operation today.  My colleagues and I 
frequently experience its constructed effects.  This conscience takes different 
forms, admittedly, having been realigned for the problems of a different age.  
In itself, this conscience is not objectionable.  It should, though, always be 
suspected for the governmental interests it serves. 
* 
Alongside his pupils, the pastoral teacher also required moral training.  The so-
called ‘normal schools’ of nineteenth century Britain were devised for this 
purpose, preparing future teachers ‘for a life of self denial’.165  The newly 
ordained teacher would then be placed in a school such as Stow’s moral 
training school in which the carefully designed architecture of that school 
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would serve to amplify his moral presence.  As Ian Hunter has argued, within 
the more intimate spaces of such schools one finds ‘the prototype of the 
modern classroom’.  Organized as it was around the ‘superintending eye and 
voice of the teacher’, it replaced the ‘molecular sub-divisions of the vast 
monitorial schoolroom’ with the personal effects of moral force.166  Pupils 
were arranged in the rising tiers of a gallery from which they would return the 
gaze of their moral exemplar, the schoolteacher.  Direct supervision and an 
array of complex moral ties replaced, in part, the distributed supervision of the 
monitorial schoolroom.  
* 
Anticipating, to some degree its progressive twentieth century successors, 
Stow’s school embodied an educational philosophy of collaborative enquiry.  
Moral formation was to occur in a mutually formed and contextually 
responsive environment, one that was open to the carefully educated whims of 
its co-participants.  
The process would begin in the playground where pupils were observed in 
their natural state.  Upon their return to the gallery any case of good or bad 
conduct was reviewed by the master, who would encourage the ‘whole gallery 
to join in’ as they did in all other exercises.167  The entire school was thereby 
recruited to an investigation that would conclude by ‘applauding the good 
deed, or condemning the misdemeanor’. 168  Here the effect of peers (the 
‘power of the Sympathy of Numbers’) was elevated as a ‘principle of the 
highest importance’.  Stow viewed this socially mediated power as an 
‘influence, mighty either for good or evil’.  At present it was ‘all on the side of 
evil’ due to the adverse training of the streets.  ‘To lay hold of this principle’, 
Stow argued, ‘and turn it to good, is the great desideratum’.169  The gallery was 
designed precisely to harness this power.    
Take the boy who steals his playfellow’s toy:  The master takes no action 
in the playground, but ‘when the children are again seated in the school 
gallery, as usual, he commences the process of examination.’ Today the pupils 
will investigate the case of the boy who stole a toy.  At this point the story is 
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abstracted from the culprit, whom it is unnecessary to name, as his head will 
hang down: ‘he is visible to all by his downcast and reddened countenance’.  The 
master reminds his subjects that although ‘he had not observed him, God 
assuredly had; or rather, he draws out this statement from the children 
themselves’. 170   Through yet more questions and answers the mode of 
punishment is discussed, negotiated and decided.  Thus the whole group 
participates in moral correction. 
As a school inspector explained in a manual describing various techniques 
for schooling the working classes; the teacher must ‘be ready to seize every 
opportunity presented by passing events’ for ‘impressing on the child’s heart 
some valuable lesson’ from scripture.171  Natural events occurring in and 
around the school, subjected to the collective judgment making processes of 
the gallery, would transform ‘wild beings’ into moral subjects.172  This mode of 
schooling would instill ‘habits of investigation’ enabling those instructed in 
these habits to interrogate the mundane events of daily life and expose them 
to religious appraisal.  The child’s soul would be ‘formed and transformed into 
wholesome channels, which will benefit the child to his life’s end and beyond 
it’.173   
* 
Even though the gallery school-hall, with its rising tiers of moral 
condemnation, may appear in retrospect to be the most striking feature of the 
moral training school, the mechanisms of examination were not exclusively 
concentrated here.  They were distributed across the architectures and social 
relations of the school upon which the gallery depended.  Throughout the 
school site, individuals learnt how to construct the moral truth of each 
moment, where each moment became a potential case for whole-school 
examination.  Through play, during conversation, and following instruction, 
the child developed a unique and devolved capacity to judge personal and 
interpersonal conduct, even though the gallery would in all likelihood never be 
assembled for the glory of that particular moment to which it would attach a 
collective verdict.  
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* 
The pastoral teacher signified the moral template to which all would aspire.  
He would demonstrate those attributes his pupils were expected to develop.174  
Whilst his moral bearing and composure would, from the perspective of his 
pupils, initially represent a distant ideal, his engagement with each individual 
child would be intimate from the outset.  This relationship would demand that 
he place himself ‘on such terms with his pupils so that they can, without fear, 
make him their confidant, unburden their minds, and tell him of any little 
mischief they may have done’.175  This confessional practice would build upon, 
but also go beyond, the playground-gallery system of observation and 
correction.  It would extend a truth procedure outside this architectural 
system, developing an obligation to confess on behalf of the child that would 
cover a whole range of activities far greater than mere playground 
misdemeanors.   
* 
The overall thrust of a confessional event, whether it occurs in a school, on a 
couch or in private, operates in a direction opposite to that which we might 
expect.  The obligation to confess has become ‘so deeply ingrained’, Foucault 
argues, that we ‘no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains 
us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, 
‘demands’ only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is because a constraint 
holds it in place, the violence of a power weighs it down’.  Every confession 
comes ‘at the price of a kind of liberation’.176  Confession frees, or so we are 
led to believe, and power reduces one to silence. 
* 
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Be assured, confession will not liberate your inner truth.  Your true self, your 
inner being is not awaiting its timely disclosure.  We are materially constructed 
through confessional practices to produce truths about ourselves that reflect 
the discourses in which we have been schooled.  If you were to resist these 
imperatives to expose your inner self, and become voluble about that which 
lies within you, perhaps silence would be your tactic.  Can you not see how 
this injunction, this learned impulse to confess, renders your silence awkward?  
You would appear distinctly inhuman if you were to declare yourself empty, 
and affirm your superficial, socially distributed nature.   
* 
In the moral training school, pupils were expected to construct themselves 
according to an order of discourse they absorbed through the morally focused, 
morally saturated engagements of their environment.  The idea was that every 
induced revelation concerning the child’s inner being would generate intrinsic 
modifications in the child who uttered it.  Inner truth was here a function of 
the larger framework of pastoral relations within which the child was 
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positioned.  The overall objective of confession in the moral training school 
was to develop the child’s capacity for reflecting on and governing the self.  
Considered from a distance, pastoral power would allow mechanisms of state 
to develop a certain degree of purchase on the subjectivity of the child.  
Pastoral technique would facilitate the formation of a governable self-
regulating citizenry once moral training was extended to the entire population.  
Here was developed a mode of examination that was more personal than the 
disciplinary technology described above, for it was no longer preoccupied with 
the operations of a complex disciplinary machinery.  This is not to suggest that 
pastoral examination operated without external artifice.  It, too, relied on 
distributed techniques and architectures in order to function.  And yet, its 
focus in constructing the interiority of those subjected to its practices, was 
more intensely developed, depending less on bodily manipulation, and more 
on interpersonal techniques of supervision and confession that were better 
able to endure outside any institutional confinements. 
* 
These two institutions – monitorial and moral training – employed relatively 
distinct methods of examination that were distributed within, rather than 
imposed upon, the relations that constituted the school.  But these institutions 
also borrowed from one another, creating hybrid techniques.  Those hybrids 
foreshadowed a more complete integration that occurred in the late nineteenth 
century state-sponsored elementary schools of Britain and elsewhere.   
* 
The monitorial school slowly shifted in its approaches to an increased 
dependence on simultaneous moral instruction.  Some very early examples of 
this can be found in the archive.  In 1819, according to a report from France, 
one monitorial institution was making use of a pastoral technique similar to 
that which Stow would later ‘pioneer’.   
 
When a scholar has committed fraud, the teacher makes it known to the whole 
school, and asks the scholars, if they know any declaration of the Holy Spirit which 
is applicable to the case.  [They] hasten to quote some passage of Holy Scripture 
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[and offer other passages suggesting a route to correction].  Thus the teacher 
disappears before the Almighty…[the children now governed by the] Holy One 
who reveals himself to their tender minds, by means of their fellow scholars. 
Religious instruction becomes mutual.’177   
 
The critics of monitorial schooling did not, though, view it as an intimate 
space where tender instruction, and moral discernment could be installed.  
They claimed that pupils were on the whole too numerous to benefit from the 
moral example of the master, and monitors were too ignorant.  And so, those 
economies of instruction that were once a disciplinary selling point eventually 
came under sustained attack, and monitorial schools attempted to adjust their 
techniques in response.  According to a monitorial school manual issued in 
1856, the regimented hall should be overhauled and divided into three parts, 
with small groups sitting in semicircles at the front, standard fixed benches for 
classes in the middle, and larger groups assembled in a gallery at the back.  
With a heavy curtain partitioning off each section the monitorial school would 
become a more intimate environment.  Playgrounds were also annexed, now 
‘regarded by good teachers’ in the monitorial school ‘as places in which the 
dispositions of boys are frequently most strikingly manifested’, and upon 
which subsequent instruction should rest.178  Nevertheless, the school was still 
to be run according to a disciplinary framework: classes were to move from 
one section to the next according to a rigid timetable and on a regular basis; 
there would be a signal upon which the children leave their seats and march 
according to a beat, ‘one, two, three, four, to indicate the time to which they 
are to move’.179  Various other commands would regulate the raising of 
curtains, distribution of books, cleaning of slates and so on.  In addition, the 
school was still taught and run by the scholars themselves, and if trustworthy 
assistants could not be found the curtains would be raised returning the school 
to a less intimate disciplinary system. 
* 
Moral training appears allergic at first sight to a similar influx of disciplinary 
devices.   Its proponents believed that the ‘social body cannot be constructed 
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like a machine, on abstract principles which merely include physical motions’.  
The social body also required ‘the cultivation of religion and morality’ and 
thereby necessitated the intimacies and methods of the moral training 
school.180  Yet, disciplinary elements can still be identified in Stow’s design: 
obedience must be ‘instant’ and children should move ‘à la militaire’ with every 
motion of the class being ‘as much as possible simultaneous’ and according to 
precise verbal instructions. 181   The desired position and gait of the 
schoolmaster is minutely described,182 and the school is referred to repeatedly 
as a ‘machine’.183  As with disciplinary power, any pastoral regime must be 
presumed to have its defects, and be seen as a system of only partial success.  
Alone, the pastoral teacher bore an impossible responsibility for the 
betterment of the lower classes and other socially marginalized groups.  As it 
turned out, the success of pastoral technique depended on its integration with 
the activities of other actors and discourses.  Fortunately for the pastoral 
schoolteacher, towards the end of the nineteenth century a rising concern for 
the health and hygiene of the population led to a proliferation of agencies 
concerned with the workings of the home.  It was within this complex of 
agencies and ‘tutelary agents’ that the pastoral schoolteacher began to find 
support and adapt, supplementing a discourse of moral rescue with new 
discourses of hygiene and social health.184  The confessional techniques of 
examination also expanded at an increasing rate, adapting in turn to new 
institutional sites, allowing the shaping of the private self to become a 
widespread activity. 
* 
It is, nonetheless, worth returning to the moral training school in order to 
focus on the precise functioning of a technique before its proliferation.  This 
provides a conceptual grounding that can help clarify the significance of later 
developments.  We can already see within the moral training school more 
modern ideas, such as those of a ‘‘child-centred’ pedagogy, overseen by an 
unobtrusive yet vigilant teacher’.185  It remains to be seen how more recent 
pedagogies maintained and modified a project once explicitly concerned with 
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the formation of souls.  For our current purposes it is sufficient to note that 
during the nineteenth century this parallel tradition in examination was already 
in existence.  It followed a path that was distinct from the disciplinary route.  
This alternative approach makes a virtue of pedagogies that pay attention to 
the natural environment and dispositions of the child.  In a display of 
openness it recruits peers to the processes of assessment within a setting that 
has been carefully fabricated by the teacher and the school.  The child is 
located very explicitly at the centre of examination for his or her own personal 
benefit.  These clear affinities between Stow’s nineteenth century pedagogy 
and more recent trends in education should alert us to the potential for a 
moral scheme behind all traditions that are resolutely anti-mechanistic, 
traditions that ‘prioritize’ and listen to the child.   
* 
If we broaden our contemporary definition of examination to include the wide 
range of pedagogic techniques that extend beyond the examination hall 
throughout and outside the school, techniques that seek to reveal the truth of 
the child and use that truth to inform the educational encounter, that is, if we 
interpret examination broadly and acknowledge its widely distributed effects, it 
should be clear that a history of examination must pay attention to pastoral 
developments as much as it does to disciplinary ones.  In other words, a 
history of examination should pay as much attention to techniques that 
respond to the child, in the child’s own terms taking into account his or her 
prior experience and wider nature, than it does to those more easily 
condemned techniques that seek to define the environment within which the 
child must exist and discipline the child according to its artificial terms. The 
line of distinction between these two techniques has, of course, been blurred.  
Extending our gaze back to a period when they can be more easily separated 
heightens sensitivity.  It helps prevent our being blinded by a desire to 
challenge only the more conspicuous, heavy machinery of contemporary 
examination.  It diverts our critical gaze either side of the manifest 
accountability techniques to which education appears increasingly subject.  
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More humane-appearing traditions of examination may be just as dangerous, if 
not more so, than their disciplinary analogues.  Listening to the child –
incorporating the child’s experience into an examination procedure that has 
been lightened, and rendered formative – does not allow us to escape the 
grasp of power.  It merely represents a switch in emphasis from one venerable 
tradition of power to another. 
* 
Today it is almost impossible to sense what it would be like to live an 
unexamined life.  This is not simply due to the fact that examinations are 
everywhere, so much so that it would be difficult to pass through any modern 
system of schooling without being examined at one point or another.  The 
problem is greater than objecting to the mere empirical spread of 
examinations which have come to: regulate and record educational progress, 
or lack of progress; inform the relation between child and parent, guardian, 
relative or friend; suffuse practices of teaching and management; inform 
practices of social care, therapy186 and incarceration; back up or undermine 
policy; control access to further education; inform employers, condition 
employees and so on.  The empirical spread of examination is certainly 
alarming, and yet the problem is greater than objecting to the extent of its 
reach.  Expressing our profound disapproval of examination, as a ubiquitous 
rationality that defines our epoch and limits how we think, cannot in itself 
solve the difficulty we face.  We must confront the examined life more 
radically than this.  Perhaps we do live in ‘an age of examination’; perhaps it is 
indeed difficult to imagine how we could live differently without this incessant 
requirement to test and to score.  But this is not a matter for the imagination 
to solve alone.  This is not simply about picturing how we could educate 
differently, either without examination or with less of it.  To say that it is 
about picturing how we could relate to each other differently would be closer 
to the point.  Still, the difficulty we face in an age of examination cannot be 
combatted by dreaming what it would be like to go without examination and 
whether by virtue of this vision there is any scope for adjusting what we do, 
!Part I from Benign Violence: Education in and Beyond the Age of Reason by Ansgar Allen published by 
Palgrave Macmillan in 2014 – pre-copyedited version.!
how we teach, how we learn, how we school.  Examination cannot simply be 
removed and dreams cannot simply replace it.   
Firstly, examination constitutes the school as its ontological condition.  To 
confront examination, one must confront the school.  Secondly, insofar as 
dreams are wishes of the heart (as any Disney film will tell you), they will be 
limited by the sensibilities of the modern soul.  As I have endeavored to show, 
this soul may itself be the product of examination.  Examination constitutes the 
soul of the child through a cluster of practices that make up the school.  Since 
the nineteenth century, examination has produced the concepts or conceptual 
frame through which we have come to know ourselves.  The monitorial 
school was an early laboratory in this effort, integrating a process that 
rendered an amorphous mass legible, with a procedure that taught the 
partitioned mass how to behave.  The moral training school further developed 
this construction of the soul by teaching its subjects how they should relate to 
themselves, initially through an external set of architectures and interpersonal 
relations, and later through the absorption of these procedures to an inner 
conversation that constructed the self to be confessed.  These two early 
nineteenth century sites established the frameworks of schooling from which 
later institutions were built.  They developed examining strategies that would 
feed into the expansion of a far wider examining complex.  Towards the end 
of the nineteenth century the specific labor of producing souls was multiplying 
across an increasingly dense grid of social agencies tasked with revealing and 
directing the truth of personal and social life.   
* 
Any critique of examination and its deleterious effects should avoid the 
tendency we so often witness to high-minded indignation.  It should avoid the 
temptation to denounce examination, that great institution, as a repressive 
influence against which the soul must fight in order to prevent its 
abridgement.  The examining complex within which we were bred as infants 
now constitutes us as subjects; we owe our existence to it.  A radical critique 
of examination must therefore begin by objecting to the subjects we have 
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become.  Here we must follow The Immoralist who ‘despised…the creature 
who was due to teaching, whom education had painted on the surface’.187 
* 
A radical critique of examination must, by definition, unsettle the soul.  If you 
would prefer to avoid this experience, if you wish to remain secure from 
introspection and doubt, you must cultivate your attachment to historical 
constants.  In particular, you should assert the uniform consistency of human 
experience throughout time.  This consistency will enable you to connect in 
principle with all human life, as you share so much in common.  Above all 
else, you must believe that there is an entity that endures through it all, 
‘something unchanging in all turmoil’, 188  something that defines us as 
distinctively human.  Then you must object to any theory claiming the 
contingency of the human form.  Find reassurance by claiming to observe 
recurring human traits throughout time.  Remain committed to these facts.  
With the facts pushed into view you, yourself, can retreat from view because 
‘the facts speak for themselves’.   
! !
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